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UNITED STATES V. NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRISES:
WHAT TO DO WHEN GOVERNMENT
ATTORNEYS ENGAGE IN
MISCONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, federal judges have been increasingly willing to im-
pose sanctions for a party's violation of a court order,' especially during
the discovery phase of litigation.2 These judges view violations of court
orders as a direct threat to their authority3 and recognize the need for
sanctions as a deterrent to such abuses.' The Ninth Circuit, in particu-
lar, has taken the lead in using sanctions as both a specific deterrent
against the conduct of a particular litigant, and as a general deterrent
against misconduct by other litigants.' In addition, the United States
1. Although state courts have experienced a corresponding increase in the number of
sanctions applied, this Note will deal exclusively with the discovery sanctions imposed by the
federal courts. See Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse: Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the California Code of Civil Procedure, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567
(1981) for a discussion of the increased use of sanctions in both the federal and state courts.
2. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGA-
TIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 21-26 (1978). Courts may rely on several sources of authority for
imposing these sanctions including Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37 & 41 and the inherent
power of the courts to protect the orderly administration of justice. See infra notes 4, 8 & 79-
82.
3. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980) (violation of
court order is afront to inherent power of courts to protect authority and dignity of judiciary);
see also Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir.
1982) (courts have inherent power to dismiss action to ensure integrity of their orders); Fend-
ler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1975) (decision whether to
dismiss action for failure to comply with court order is within discretion of trial judge under
the inherent power).
4. United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980). In
Sumitomo, the Ninth Circuit identified the three general purposes of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 37(b) sanctions:
(I) to prevent the disobedient party from profiting from his own failure to com-
ply with the court order;
(2) to serve as a specific deterrent to secure compliance with the order at hand;
and
(3) to serve as a general deterrent so that the court may consider the impact that
sanctions would have on this and other litigation.
Id. at 1369; see Comment, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery
Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
5. Id.; see also Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983) (in choos-
ing among available sanctions, district court may properly consider deterrent value of dismis-
sal order on future litigants).
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Supreme Court has authorized the use of harsh sanctions to ensure that
"other parties to other lawsuits [do not] feel freer than we think ... they
should feel to flout other discovery orders of the district courts." 6
A district court may only impose sanctions, however, within the
confines of due process requirements.7 The Supreme Court has admon-
ished that the harshest sanctions' are only to be imposed where the fail-
ure to comply with the court order is due to "wilfulness, bad faith or any
fault [of the party sanctioned]." 9 Further, the Ninth Circuit has declared
that harsh measures may be particularly appropriate where the govern-
ment is the "disobedient party."'
Most cases dealing with sanctions involve private attorneys, repre-
senting private litigants, not government attorneys. The standards used
to evaluate the propriety of conduct by a civil government attorney have
not been clearly set forth. In United States v. National Medical Enter-
prises (NME II)," the Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision of a district
court to dismiss the government's case for interfering with the fact-find-
ing process and attempting to influence witnesses. 2 The appellate court
6. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, rehg
denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976) (per curiam) (dismissal upheld for failure to comply with discov-
ery order to answer interrogatories even though party had complied by time of sanction hear-
ing). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37 empowers a court to order a party to provide or
permit discovery. The Rule further states that a court may sanction a party for failing 'to
comply with the discovery order. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
7. See infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
8. A wide range of sanctions is available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37.
In ascending order of harshness, a court may:
require the delinquent party or his attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by the innocent party as a result of the failure to obey the
order; strike out portions of pleadings; deem certain facts as established for purposes
of the action or preclude admission of evidence on designated matters; dismiss all or
part of the action; or render a default judgment against the disobedient party.
Sumitomo, 617 F.2d at 1369; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 42.3 (2d ed.
1985) (supplement to C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(1969-85)). See generally Symposium, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse-The Recent
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Views from the Bench and the Bar, 57 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 680 (1983), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CURRENT PROBLEMS
IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 261 (1983); Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attor-
neys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619 (1977).
9. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958) (dismissal not proper where inability of party to produce documents
due to foreign law protecting those records and not due to party's bad faith).
10. Sumitomo, 617 F.2d at 1370. "The effectiveness of and need for harsh measures is
particularly evident when the disobedient party is the government." Id.
11. 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986). In this Note, NME 11 will be used to refer to the Ninth
Circuit opinion at 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986); NME I will refer to the district court opinion
at 107 F.R.D. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.
1986).
12. NMEI, 107 F.R.D. at 631.
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vacated the dismissal, holding that the district court abused its discretion
by not applying a three-part test prior to dismissing the action.13 The
test suggested by the Ninth Circuit would require the trial court to con-
sider alternative sanctions, determine the prejudicial impact to the de-
fendants and weigh the public interest.14 This "public interest" element
is not usually present in private actions."' By requiring that the district
court view the public interest in dismissing an action, the Ninth Circuit
holds a civil government attorney to a lesser standard of conduct than his
private counterpart.
The issues raised in NME II suggest the need to clarify the standard
of conduct required of government attorneys and to establish a test by
which courts can evaluate misconduct when deciding whether to impose
sanctions. This Note will first explore the analyses used by courts when
confronted with a case in which a private attorney engages in miscon-
duct. It will then examine the various competing interests involved when
a government attorney engages in misconduct. Further, this Note will
propose a test by which a district court may determine when dismissal is
the proper sanction for government misconduct.16 As set out below, the
author believes it is time for the courts to reexamine and clearly articu-
late the standards applied to civil government attorneys. With a proper
analytical framework, courts may formulate guidelines which: (1) will
strike a balance between the many competing concerns; and (2) will be
truly enforceable against civil government counsel.
17
II. EXAMINATION OF THE CASE
In late 1983, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a
complaint in the Eastern District of California alleging that National
Medical Enterprises, Inc. (National Medical) i" had violated the federal
13. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
14. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
15. The NME II court, however, professed that it was not addressing the issue whether
government attorneys should be held to a different standard than private attorneys. Id. at 913-
14.
16. Dismissal has been held to be a proper sanction where a party willfully violates a court
order. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d
1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
17. This Note will focus on civil government attorneys and will only deal with federal
prosecutors for purposes of analogy. See infra notes 245-60 and accompanying text. Further,
this Note will emphasize the duties and obligations of the attorneys working for the Depart-
ment of Justice, the largest employer of federal lawyers. See Report of the Civil Service Com-
mission, "The Oliver Report": Excerpts from the Model Attorney Evaluation System, 32 FED.
B.J. 39 (1973).
18. The complaint filed by the DOJ named both National Medical Enterprises, Inc. and
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antitrust laws.' 9 National Medical owned one hospital in the Modesto
area and had recently acquired a second hospital z.2  The DOJ contended
that when National Medical acquired this second hospital, a single owner
controlled too many hospital beds in the area thus violating the antitrust
laws.21
During the discovery phase of the case, government counsel con-
tacted seven prospective third party witnesses.22 The DOJ attorneys told
those witnesses that the government would like to attend any interviews
that the witnesses granted to National Medical.23 In addition, the gov-
ernment asked the witnesses to provide the DOJ with copies of any docu-
ments that they gave to National Medical.24 National Medical moved
for a protective order to prohibit the government from making further
"requests. ' 25
The district court granted National Medical's motion for a protec-
tive order 26 to eliminate "unwarranted confusion and misunderstanding"
caused by the DOJ counsel. 27 District Judge Robert E. Coyle found that
National Medical Hospitals, a wholly owned subsidiary, as defendants. This Note will refer to
the defendants collectively as "National Medical."
19. The complaint alleged a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982). United States v. National Medical Enters., 792 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). These
antitrust charges arose from recent hospital acquisitions in the Modesto, California area. At
the time of the suit, National Medical was the fourth largest health care company in the
United States and operated over 450 health care facilities nationwide. Id.; Brief for the Appel-
lant at 2, United States v. National Medical Enters., 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-
2485) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. Since 1969, National Medical had owned Doctor's Med-
ical Center, the largest hospital in Modesto. NME 11, 792 F.2d at 908. In December 1982,
National Medical acquired Modesto City Hospital, the third largest hospital in Modesto. Id.
By obtaining ownership of this second hospital, DOJ alleged that National Medical's share of
the total hospital beds in the area was above the DOJ Merger Guidelines, and thus violated the
antitrust laws. Id. After seven months of civil investigation by the DOJ, the government filed
suit in district court. Appellant's Brief, supra at 1.
20. Appellant's Brief, supra note 19, at 1.
21. NME II, 792 F.2d at 908.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). A court may make any order "which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden ...." Id.
27. United States v. National Medical Enters., No. CV-F-83-481 REC (E.D. Cal. May 18,
1984) [hereinafter May 18, 1984 Order] (order establishing procedures for witness interviews
and for obtaining documents); see also United States v. National Medical Enters., 107 F.R.D.
628, 631 (E.D. Cal. 1985). The district judge in NME I described the circumstances as "over-
reaching by the government." Id. Upon reviewing the incidents leading to the May 18, 1984
Order, Judge Coyle stated that it was "incredible" that the government believed no confusion
existed or had ever existed. May 18, 1984 Order, supra, at 2 n. 1. The court then listed several
examples of the confusion caused by the DOJ attorney conduct. The custodian of several
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the government's statements to prospective witnesses had deprived Na-
tional Medical of the opportunity to meet privately with individuals pre-
viously interviewed by DOJ counsel.28 The protective order emphasized
that each witness was free to choose whether to grant an interview on his
own terms to either party.2 9 In addition, Judge Coyle sent letters to each
of the seven prospective witnesses encouraging them to use their discre-
tion in granting interviews or providing documents to either side in the
action.30
Both parties conducted extensive discovery over the next several
months. In 1985, National Medical moved to dismiss the suit alleging
that a DOJ attorney's conduct at two depositions violated the earlier pro-
tective order.31 National Medical alleged that during one deposition, a
DOJ attorney discouraged a neutral witness from providing information
which he was otherwise inclined to furnish.32 At another deposition, the
same DOJ attorney allegedly attempted to limit a third-party deponent's
statements concerning possible additional improprieties by government
counsel.3 3 The district court accepted National Medical's charges that
the government attorney had made comments during the deposition in
an attempt to discredit National Medical and to influence neutral witness
public records said he had been "instructed" by the government not to permit National Medi-
cal to review any public documents without first contacting the DOJ. Id. In addition, another
witness stated that the DOJ had requested that government attorneys be allowed to attend any
interviews granted by the witness to National Medical and to receive copies of any documents
requested by National Medical. Id. at 3 n.2. Although both individuals considered the DOJ
requests unusual, they complied because it was the government that made the requests. Id.
28. May 18, 1984 Order, supra note 27, at 3. Judge Coyle went on to state that even
though the DOJ conduct "may not breach the ethical standards of the profession . . . this
method of trial preparation ... smacks of an approach of one-upsmanship which the court
finds distasteful and disfavors." Id. at 3 n.2.
29. Id. at 4-5.
30. NME II, 792 F.2d at 909 (quoting May 18, 1984 Order of the District Court). Judge
Coyle was concerned that government counsel were not "sensitive to the fact that, whether
intended or not, 'requests' to witnesses from government counsel are likely to carry more
weight than those from private counsel." May 18, 1984 Order, supra note 27, at 3 n.2, 4. The
letter sent by the district court to the prospective witnesses provided in relevant part:
In the event counsel for either party to this case request an opportunity to interview
you, the decision to grant an interview is entirely at your discretion and you are free
to dictate the terms of any such interview. The Court encourages you, however, to
speak privately and freely with counsel for both sides and to provide each side with
any documents you feel appropriate to disclose.
May 18, 1984 Order, supra note 27, at Letter Attachment. Judge Coyle believed that this
letter would rectify any misconduct which had already taken place. NME I, 107 F.R.D. at
631.
31. Brief for the Appellees at 1, United States v. National Medical Enters., 792 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-2485) [hereinafter Appellees' Briefl.
32. NME 11, 792 F.2d at 909.
33. Id.
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testimony.34
The district court then issued an order concluding that the state-
ments made by the DOJ attorneys "during the [two] depositions were
highly improper and had the potential of influencing these witnesses in
their responses to appropriate questions on discovery. ' 3  The judge fur-
ther stated that "there ha[d] been a sufficient violation of the spirit and
intention of the [protective] order in an attempt to influence witnesses
and the outcome of this litigation to warrant dismissal of the action.
36
National Medical, in the view of Judge Coyle, had presented no evidence
that the witnesses were in fact influenced or that the defendants were
prejudiced. Hence, the district court declined to dismiss the case but
instead imposed a $3000 sanction against the government.37
The parties proceeded with the case and trial began in July 1985.
After one week of trial, National Medical renewed its previous motion to
dismiss for misconduct of government counsel. 38 This time, the DOJ
had supposedly made comments to a neutral witness on the eve of her
trial testimony.39 The alleged statements suggested that National Medi-
cal had made a series of payoffs to effect the sale of a competitor hospital
to National Medical.' This acquisition of the competitor hospital by
National Medical was the subject of the underlying antitrust suit.41 In
addition, a DOJ attorney supposedly told the witness that National Med-
ical was a disreputable company because it did not have any female cor-
porate executives.42 After the district court held evidentiary hearings
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also United States v. National Medical Enters., No. CV-F-83-481 REC (E.D.
Cal. May 21, 1985) at 4 [hereinafter May 21, 1985 Order].
36. NMEII, 792 F.2d at 910.
37. NMEI, 107 F.R.D. at 631.
38. Id. at 629.
39. Id. at 629-30. The witness involved was a neutral third party, Ms. Sheila Yuter. Ms.
Yuter was the Director of Planning for a hospital unrelated to the action. Id. Prior to testify-
ing at trial, she met with one of the DOJ attorneys to review her proposed testimony. Id. Ms.
Yuter set out in a declaration that during that meeting the DOJ attorney made several unsolic-
ited and improper remarks which bore no relation to her proposed testimony. Id. Ms. Yuter
declared that she believed these remarks were made by the government to convince her that
National Medical had acted improperly and to persuade her of the strength of the govern-
ment's position. Id. at 631. The declaration of Sheila Yuter is set forth in Judge Coyle's
opinion. Id. at 629 n.1.
40. Id. at 630. The statements made by DOJ counsel included remarks that several princi-
pals at Modesto City Hospital had been "paid off" to effect the sale of Modesto City Hospital
to National Medical. Id. The payments were described by the government as "big" payoffs
and that the people involved were "taken care of" by National Medical. Id.
41. NME 1I, 792 F.2d at 908.
42. NME I, 107 F.R.D. at 631. One evening, before Ms. Yuter's trial testimony, several
DOJ attorneys went to Ms. Yuter's hotel room to talk with her. One female government
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and heard oral arguments on National Medical's motion,4 3 the court
ruled from the bench that the government's conduct "constitute[d] yet
another attempt by plaintiff's counsel to improperly influence a neutral
witness for the plaintiff."'  The court further stated that
[t]he defendants have been and are faced with repeated at-
tempts to improperly influence witnesses in giving testimony in
a matter of great importance .... Government's counsel will
not be given a free rein to attempt to influence witnesses and if
they happen to be caught where the witness has in fact been
influenced, only then will the court assure that such activities
will not continue.45
In response to the DOJ attorney misconduct, the court dismissed the
case with prejudice.46
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of monetary sanc-
tions.47 The court, however, vacated the dismissal of the action and re-
manded the suit so that the district judge could reconsider the case
according to the proper legal standard.48
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Monetary Discovery Sanction
In reviewing the decision of the district court to impose a $3000
sanction and to dismiss the government's action, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied an abuse of discretion standard.49 The government argued that by
attorney referred to National Medical as a disreputable company for not having any women at
the corporate level. Id. The female attorney continued that she could not believe that a com-
pany would name its health maintenance organization "PMS." Id. The attorney intended
"PMS" to refer to premenstrual syndrome and Ms. Yuter understood the reference in that
context. Id. at 631 n.3. While Ms. Yuter believed that the woman attorney was attempting to
establish a personal rapport with her, Ms. Yuter found the statements inappropriate. Id. at
631.
43. Id. at 629.
44. Id. at 631.
45. Id. at 632.
46. Id. Dismissal with prejudice is reserved for the most egregious cases because it oper-
ates as an adjudication on the merits. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Under the doctrine of res judi-
cata, such a dismissal bars the refiling of the previously dismissed complaint. See Phillips v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 596, 601 P.2d 596 (1979).
47. NME II, 792 F.2d at 914.
48. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that Judge Coyle should have (1) considered lesser sanc-
tions; (2) determined the prejudicial impact of the government's conduct; and (3) weighed the
public interest in the action before dismissing the suit. Id. at 913.
49. United States v. National Medical Enters., 792 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1986). The
abuse of discretion standard is often seen as a necessary deference by the appellate courts to the
power required by the trial courts to conduct trials. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
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imposing the monetary sanction, the district court had abused its discre-
tion because the conduct of the DOJ attorneys at the two depositions did
not violate the protective order." The government acknowledged that
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b),5 a district court is author-
ized to impose a wide range of sanctions where a party failed to comply
with a discovery order.52 However, the DOJ argued that a monetary
sanction in this case was not proper.53 The government contended that
the protective order dealt only with interviewing witnesses and request-
ing documents, while the conduct in question involved attorney behavior
at depositions. 4 Thus, the government believed that even if the conduct
at the depositions was improper, it did not violate the protective order.
55
The Ninth Circuit instead viewed the district court's protective or-
der as prohibiting the DOJ attorneys from dissuading a witness from
referring to discoverable documents.56 Consequently, the circuit court
held that the DOJ laywer's comments during the deposition could be
interpreted as violating the protective order.57 In, upholding the mone-
tary sanction imposed by the district court, the Ninth Circuit deferred to
the district judge's finding that his order had been violated.58 The appel-
late court noted that the district judge is best able to assess whether a
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 637 (1971). The proper inquiry
by the appellate court is not whether it would have ruled differently on the original matter, but
whether the district court abused its discretion in its actions. Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 761 (1982). In fact, such matters as discovery or the conduct
of counsel are seen as particularly deserving of appellate court deference because they involve a
"feel" for the case which can only be obtained by the trial court. Id. at 760-61. Judge Friendly
has also admonished that "[tihe district judge must be master of how to get cases to trial, and
has had opportunities for frequent observation of the offending counsel which would not
emerge from a cold record." Id. at 761. Thus, in NME II, because attorney conduct was
involved, it was proper for the Ninth Circuit to apply the abuse of discretion standard. For a
further discussion of the abuse of discretion standard, see infra note 109.
50. NME II, 792 F.2d at 911.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Rule 37(b) empowers a court to impose sanctions for failure to
comply with a court order.
52. United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (1980); see
supra notes 4 & 8.
53. The Ninth Circuit did point out that the district court's authority is limited to sanc-
tions (1) which are just, and (2) which specifically relate to the particular claim at issue in the
order. NME II, 792 F.2d at 910.
54. Id. at 911.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Judge Coyle made express findings that he believed both his first and second orders
had been violated. May 21, 1985 Order, supra note 35, at 4. "[T]here has been a sufficient
violation of the spirit and intention of the [May 18, 1984 Order] in an attempt to influence
witnesses and the outcome of this litigation to warrant dismissal of the action." Id.; see also
United States v. National Medical Enters., 107 F.R.D. 628, 631-32 (E.D. Cal. 1985), affd in
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party had complied with one of his or her own orders.5 9 The circuit
court concluded that the district court had not erred in imposing the
$3000 sanction.6"
B. Dismissal Sanction
The government next argued that even if the monetary sanction was
not an abuse of the trial court's discretion, the district judge improperly
dismissed the action.6" The Ninth Circuit noted that Judge Coyle had
relied on government counsel's two previous violations of his orders as
the basis for dismissing the government's suit.6" The appellate court,
however, distinguished between the types of conduct proscribed by the
district court's first two orders and the type of conduct in question
here.63 The circuit court characterized the first two orders as dealing
with "roadblocks to information during discovery."64 In contrast, the
court viewed the dismissal order as involving an entirely different type of
misconduct-an attempt to improperly influence a trial witness.6" As
such, the Ninth Circuit found the conduct in question to be different
from that proscribed by the previous two orders.66 The only possible link
between the three incidents, according to the appellate court, was that
the district judge had found all three to be improper.
67
As a result, the Ninth Circuit did not frame the issue as whether the
government's conduct was improper. 8 Instead, the circuit court ex-
amined whether the first two orders provided clear warning to the gov-
ernment that the district court would dismiss the case if the DOJ
attempted to influence a witness before trial.6 9 In support of this concept
part, vacated in part, 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the government's statements to
neutral witnesses were clearly misconduct and violated the court's two previous orders).
59. NME II, 792 F.2d at 911; see also Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 947
(9th Cir. 1976).
60. NME II, 792 F.2d at 911.
61. United States v. National Medical Enters., 792 F.2d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. The government initially argued that Judge Coyle had clearly erred in finding that
a DOJ attorney had made comments that National Medical "paid off" individuals in order to
complete the acquisition. The Ninth Circuit, however, after reviewing the record, declined to
hold that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. Id.
63. Id. at 911-12.
64. Id. at 912.
65. Id. The court of appeals viewed these most recent government improprieties as an
entirely new type of misconduct because National Medical had not claimed an inability to
conduct discovery as a result. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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of required notice, the court cited In re Rubin.70 In Rubin, the bank-
ruptcy court struck an answer to a petition for involuntary bankruptcy as
a sanction for the debtor's failure to comply with discovery orders. 71 Re-
viewing the order to strike the answer, the Rubin court stated that a
party must be given notice by the trial court that continued noncompli-
ance will result in a severe sanction. 72 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
order striking the answer because no warning had been afforded the
debtor in Rubin.73
The NME II court analogized to the Rubin case and found there
had been insufficient warning to the government that their conduct re-
garding the trial witness would violate the protective orders. 4 There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that without adequate notice to the
government, the misconduct underlying the third order did not violate
the first two orders.75
1. Power of the court to dismiss
By analyzing the dismissal order separately from the first two or-
ders, the NME II court refused to allow the district court to rely on
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b) 76 or 41(b). 77 These Rules allow a
court to dismiss an action where a party has violated a court order.78
The circuit court recognized, however, that a district court has the inher-
ent power to dismiss an action " 'to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the integrity of [its] orders.' ,,79 The appellate court cau-
70. 769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1985).
71. Id. at 613.
72. Id. at 616-17.
73. Id. at 619.
74. NME II, 792 F.2d at 912.
75. Id. The appellate court found unpersuasive National Medical's argument that the dis-
trict court could rely on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b) or 41(b) to uphold the dismis-
sal and instead ruled that the third order must be treated separately from the first two orders.
Id.
76. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) contains language empowering district
courts to impose sanctions, including dismissal, against a party who fails to comply with a
court discovery order. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory
committee's note.
77. NMEII, 792 F.2d at 912. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that a court
may dismiss a case for failure to comply with a court order. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 41 advisory committee's notes.
78. NME II, 792 F.2d at 912.
79. Id. (quoting Phoceene Sous-Marine S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806
(9th Cir. 1982)); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Link v. Wabash
R.R., 370 U.S. 626, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 873 (1962).
In Fjelstad v. American Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985), the district
court relied on its inherent power to sanction conduct which did not violate either the Federal
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tioned that dismissal is an extreme sanction and will only be upheld if the
deceptive conduct was willful, in bad faith, or if it threatened to interfere
with the rightful decision in the case.8 ° In addition, the Ninth Circuit
stated that a district court must consider the prejudice or irreparable
harm done to the innocent party, in this case National Medical. 8
The appellate court held that the district court had abused its discre-
tion in dismissing the action by: (1) failing to consider lesser, alternative
sanctions; (2) failing to determine the prejudicial impact of the govern-
ment's conduct on National Medical; and (3) failing to weigh the public
interest in the antitrust action. 2
a. alternative sanctions
In holding that the district court had failed to consider alternative
sanctions, the appellate court rejected the argument put forth by Na-
tional Medical that the two prior protective orders were attempts by the
district court to apply lesser sanctions. The Ninth Circuit reiterated that
the district judge erred in considering the "third incident of misconduct
as a continuation of the first two."8 3 The NME II court cited other
Rules of Civil Procedure or the court's discovery orders. Id. at 1338. The district judge im-
posed a judgment of liability against Honda for refusing to provide information during discov-
ery. Id. The Ninth Circuit found the penalty too harsh for conduct which it viewed as not
"utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice." Id.
80. NME II, 792 F.2d at 912. In a case cited by the Ninth Circuit, North Am. Watch v.
Princess Ermine Jewels, 786 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), the appellants had initially represented
that they did not have the documents requested in discovery, then later the appellants pro-
duced the documents in court. The district court determined that the appellants deliberately
misled the court and dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal sanction
because of the appellants' willful violation of the discovery order and its attempt to deceive the
court and prejudice the other side. Id. at 1451.
The Ninth Circuit had stated in an earlier decision that willful deception to the court
must relate to a matter that would interfere with a rightful decision in the case to support a
sanction of dismissal. Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802
(9th Cir. 1982). In Phosmarine, in order to delay their trial, the appellants submitted false
statements, purportedly from a physician. While clearly a willful deception of the court, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the conduct was unrelated to the merits of the patent infringement
suit and held that dismissal was improper. Id. at 806.
81. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
82. Id. at 914. The Ninth Circuit found that Judge Coyle applied the incorrect legal stan-
dard in relying on the first two orders as notice of the possible dismissal of the action. The
court was quick to point out, however, that it did not condone the behavior of government
counsel. Id. The NME II court stated that the first two incidents of misconduct could only be
considered on the question of deceptive intent. Id. at 913.
83. Id. The court stated that government counsel's improper remarks to the neutral third
party witness, Ms. Yuter, were different in kind from the improper discovery tactics involved
in the first two orders. Id. Therefore, the first two incidents could not be considered as at-
tempts at imposing lesser sanctions. Id.
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Ninth Circuit cases for the proposition that the district court had abused
its discretion by failing to consider lesser sanctions before granting
dismissal.8 4
Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit stated that the two prior
incidents of DOJ misconduct were relevant only to the issues of decep-
tive intent on the part of the government and whether such conduct was
inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.8 5 The circuit
court determined that the two prior incidents of misconduct could have
been used by the district court in determining the severity of the sanction
to impose. However, the Ninth Circuit would not allow the two prior
orders to be considered as an attempt by the district court to impose
lesser sanctions.86 Therefore, Judge Coyle could not rely on these inci-
dents "alone as a fulcrum to elevate the final incident of misconduct to a
level that would allow dismissal of the action with prejudice.
87
b. prejudice to National Medical
The circuit court also found that Judge Coyle had erred in not ade-
quately considering whether National Medical had been prejudiced as a
result of the government's conduct. While acknowledging that a show-
ing of actual harm or prejudice was not a prerequisite to dismissal, 88 the
appellate court stated that Judge Coyle should have examined the possi-
ble prejudice to National Medical before dismissing the suit.89
The NME II court again cited Ninth Circuit precedent to support
84. Id. at 913-14. In In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1985), the bankruptcy court
dismissed an action because the bankruptcy trustee failed to timely file his brief with the court.
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit determined that when the deficiency is in the
management of the litigation, the court must view alternative sanctions which achieve a pen-
alty in conformity with fault. Id. at 1387.
The Ninth Circuit undertook a similar analysis in United Artists Corp. v. La Cage Aux
Folles, Inc., 771 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1985). There the district court was faced with a litigant
who continually refused to comply with discovery orders, even after the court imposed mone-
tary sanctions. Id. at 1267. The Ninth Circuit held that because the trial court had tried to
impose a lesser, monetary sanction, the lower court had not abused its discretion in dismissing
the action. Id. at 1271.
Raiford v. Pounds, 640 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1981), the last case relied on by the Ninth
Circuit in NME 11 for this rule, involved a dismissal for failure to prosecute. The trial court in
Raiford dismissed the action when the plaintiff failed to file a timely pretrial order. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, stating that because this case was "still young," the trial court had abused its
discretion by not considering lesser sanctions. Id. at 945.
85. NME I1, 792 F.2d at 913. See supra notes 79-80 for a discussion of the inherent power
of the courts.
86. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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its requirement that the district court consider prejudice to National
Medical.90 The court stressed, however, that the district judge erred in
failing to consider this factor prior to ordering dismissal.9"
c. public interest
In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the district court
should also have weighed public interest concerns before dismissing the
case.92 The Ninth Circuit required that the district court consider the
effect of dismissal for government counsel's misconduct, where the goal
of the lawsuit was to enforce laws which benefit society as a whole.93
National Medical argued that the district court had been aware of and
had considered the public interest involved in the case.94 National Medi-
cal also contended that Judge Coyle had recognized the public interest by
describing the NME I1 case as one of "great importance." '95 The appel-
late court rejected this argument.
96
The NME I1 court stated that some of the factors enumerated by the
court in Henderson v. Duncan 97 should have been weighed by the district
court before it dismissed the NME H case.98 These public interest con-
90. One case cited by the NME II court, Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.
1986), involved a dismissal for failure to comply with a court-imposed discovery schedule. In
Henderson, the Ninth Circuit held that where the integrity of the district court was involved,
and where the party had clear warnings of the consequences of his behavior, lack of actual
prejudice to the defendant was not determinative. Id. at 1425. There the district court was
correct in dismissing the case even without an express finding of prejudice.
In another case cited by the Ninth Circuit, Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.
1980), the district court twice struck the plaintiffs' complaint because it was unintelligible. Id.
at 1224. Affirming the dismissal in Schmidt, the Ninth Circuit stated that a showing of preju-
dice was not necessary as long as the court had considered the possible harm to the other
party. Id. In fact, in Schmidt, the Ninth Circuit inferred prejudice to the defendant because of
the confusing pleadings. Id. The NME 11 court also cited North American Watch where the
court found that the party's willful violations of the court's orders prejudiced North Ameri-
can's ability to prepare for trial. Id. at 1451. Having found actual prejudice, the Ninth Circuit
in North American Watch ruled that dismissal was proper. Id. For a further discussion of
Ninth Circuit precedent regarding prejudice, see infra note 160 and accompanying text.
91. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. United States v. National Medical Enters., 107 F.R.D. 628, 632 (E.D. Cal. 1985). Na-
tional Medical stressed that implicit in this language was the court's recognition that the sub-
stantive rights involved in this case were not those of an ordinary lawsuit. Appellees' Petition
for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 11, United States v. National Medical
Enters., 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-2485) [hereinafter Appellees' Rehearing Brief].
96. NME 1I, 792 F.2d at 913.
97. 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986).
98. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
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cerns include the interest in quickly resolving litigation and the interest
in deciding a case on its merits. 99 The Ninth Circuit stated that the dis-
trict court in NME II erred by failing to consider any of these public
interest concerns.100
d. government attorney
Finally, the Ninth Circuit refused to accept National Medical's con-
tention that government attorneys should be held to a more demanding
standard of conduct than private attorneys. The circuit court, while ac-
knowledging that the "status of the government attorney is unique," re-
fused to extend that observation to mean that "government attorneys
should be held to a different standard of compliance or care for dismissal
purposes."' '1
In support of this conclusion, the court of appeals distinguished its
earlier decision in United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance
Co.1°2 In Sumitomo, the court had emphasized that harsh sanctions were
more appropriate where the disobedient party was the government be-
cause those charged with enforcing the law should also set an example by
obeying the law. 03 National Medical stressed that the reasoning used in
Sumitomo also applied to the NME II case. The circuit court, however,
stated that Sumitomo did not support the proposition that a government
attorney should be held to a different standard than that required of a
private attorney.1°4 The Ninth Circuit declared that because the district
judge had not relied on such a special standard as the basis of his ruling,
the court need not address the issue on review. 05
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980). The Sumitomo case arose out of a collision at sea in
which the government brought a suit for damages. During discovery, the government failed to
answer interrogatories, even after ordered to do so by the court. Id. at 1367. The government
attorneys exhibited, in the words of the court, a "callous disregard" for their court-ordered
discovery obligations, thereby justifying an order imposing monetary sanctions personally
against the government counsel. Id. The government did subsequently answer some interrog-
atories, but refused to provide any information regarding damages. Id. at 1368. When the
district court ordered that the government supply the documents relevant to damages, the
government failed to comply. Id. Finally, the district court ordered that the government be
precluded from introducing any evidence at trial regarding its damages. Id.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that such a preclusion order was tantamount to dismissal.
Id. The court pointed out that one purpose of imposing sanctions was to deter flagrant disre-
gard for court discovery orders. Id. at 1370. Further, the court stated that harsh measures
were particularly appropriate when the disobedient party was the government. Id.
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
105. NME 1I, 792 F.2d at 913-14.
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The appellate court concluded its opinion by holding that the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion in dismissing the action.' 0 6 The
Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case to the district
judge to consider alternative sanctions, to examine the prejudice to Na-
tional Medical and to weigh the public interest involved.
10 7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Basis of the Decision
The NME 11 opinion evidences the lengths to which a court will
often go to uphold the conduct of government attorneys. Unfortunately,
because this is such a result-oriented decision, one may only speculate as
to the actual rationale used by the court.
1. The pre/post trial distinction,
In reviewing the propriety of the dismissal order, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized an arbitrary distinction between discovery misconduct and
the same type of conduct recurring once trial had begun. 0 8 The NME II
opinion notably lacks any precedent supporting the proposition that at-
tempting to influence witnesses during discovery should be analyzed sep-
arately from attempting to influence witnesses during trial. This
fortuitous event-that the DOJ acted one week after trial began-is the
pivotal, although camouflaged, component of the court's decision. The
result of such a forced distinction is unsound. Government attorneys are
virtually encouraged to engage in misconduct during discovery, confident
that the slate will be wiped clean once trial begins. The Ninth Circuit's
use of such artificial pre/post trial categories served as a means to ob-
scure the acts of the government counsel.10 9
106. Id. at 914.
107. Id. Another issue involved in the NME II case that will not be discussed in this Note
concerns the following: The government had requested that on remand the case be assigned to
a different judge. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the appearance of justice would not be
injured by remanding the case to the same judge. Id. Pointing out the substantial duplication
of efforts which would be involved, the court denied the government's request and ruled that
Judge Coyle could preside in a fair manner. Id.
108. United States v. National Medical Enters., 792 F.2d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 1986).
109. An abuse of discretion standard, like that used in NME II, affords a great deal of
deference to the observations of the district judge. See supra note 49. Using the abuse of
discretion standard, the Ninth Circuit noted that it would not reverse the district court's ruling
unless it had a "definite and firm conviction that the district court made a clear error of judg-
ment." NME II, 792 F.2d at 910.
In applying an abuse of discretion standard to review the decision of the district court, the
appellate court acknowledged that a trial judge's finding of noncompliance with one of its
orders is given considerable weight on appeal. Id. at 912. Also, a district court's ruling on the
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Judge Coyle, however, chose to examine the government's conduct
conduct of counsel is an area regarded as an exclusive specialty of the district judge. Friendly,
supra note 49, at 760; see also Skogen v. Dow Chem. Co., 375 F.2d 692, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1967).
Therefore, determinations by a district court involving the conduct of counsel appearing before
it are afforded great deference on appeal. See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. La Cage Aux
Folles, Inc., 771 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Ninth Circuit had stated in an earlier case that "[a] rule of thumb as to the meaning
of the abuse of discretion standard is that the trial court's order should not be disturbed unless
there is 'a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judg-
ment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.'" Schmidt v. Herr-
mann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (within court's discretion to
dismiss complaint for failure to comply with court order requiring an amended complaint be
filed in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
The Supreme Court has stated that whether the appellate court would have imposed the
sanction in the first place is irrelevant. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976) (per curiam). Rather, the
proper inquiry is whether the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous and whether the trial
court abused its discretion by its acts. Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d
1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's dismissal with prejudice for failure to
comply with discovery orders because trial court is in much better position to supervise con-
duct of litigants and to determine appropriate sanctions for abusive conduct); see also La Cage
Aux Folles, 771 F.2d at 1271. "We may have been inclined to impose an additional fine or
other sanction rather than granting dismissal following [plaintiff's] continuing noncompliance
with the discovery orders, but we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting dismissal." Id.
In applying an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's exercise of discretion in
dismissing an action, the Ninth Circuit had cautioned, in an earlier case, that
we must remember that the district court, not this court, exercises the discretion. As
the Supreme Court has stated, [t]he question ... is not whether ... the Court of
Appeals, would as an orginal matter have dismissed the action,' ...... The rule is a
sound one because the district court before which a case is litigated is in a far better
position than a court of appeals to supervise the conduct of the litigants and to deter-
mine appropriate sanctions for abusive conduct.
Chism, 637 F.2d at 1331 (citations omitted). Thus, much deference is afforded the trial court
by the appellate court before an abuse of discretion is found. In NME I, Judge Coyle was so
convinced that his determination was correct that he dismissed the case from the bench after
the evidentiary hearing, rather than taking the matter under submission for additional review.
United States v. National Medical Enters., 107 F.R.D. 628, 629 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986).
The NME II court relied on Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943 (9th Cir.
1976), to support this idea of appellate deference. In Van Bronkhorst, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's suit for sex discrimination was dismissed with prejudice. The
Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's dismissal with preju-
dice where the government litigant had failed to comply with court order. Id. at 952. In so
holding, the court recognized that "[t]here is no question that a District Court has the power
to dismiss a claim of a plaintiff with prejudice for failure to comply with an order of the
court .... It is equally clear that the district judge's determination that his order was not
complied with is entitled to considerable weight on appeal since he is in the best position to
assess the circumstances." Id. at 947 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Furthermore, this appellate court deference to decisions of a trial court regarding the
conduct of counsel is considered especially appropriate because
the [individual case] decision depends on first-hand observation or direct contact
with the litigation. Only the trial judge has seen the witness or observed the jury's
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by type, rather than by its time of occurrence. He found that the actions
of the government attorneys implicated the integrity of the fact-finding
process. As overseer of the pretrial phases of the case, he was concerned
with attempts by the government to influence witnesses.' 10
There is little support in analogous areas of law for the circuit
court's distinction of trial and discovery misconduct. For example, fed-
eral criminal statutes are applied to attempts to influence or intimidate a
prospective witness without regard to whether the misconduct occurred
before or after trial began.i"1 Similarly, an unavailable witness' improp-
erly influenced deposition testimony automatically becomes improperly
influenced trial testimony despite the fact that the misconduct occurred
during discovery rather than during trial.11 2 These two situations are
analogous to the NME II case because all involve attempts to influence
witnesses during the fact-finding process. The possibility of tainting the
entire trial is always present where witnesses have been influenced or in-
timidated.1"a Thus, little support appears for the court's discovery/trial
reaction to evidence. Only the trial judge has supervised the course of litigation
through discovery and pretrial, and can evaluate the diligence or procrastination of
the attorneys. In those circumstances the trial court has a superior vantage point
which an appellate court cannot replicate. The trial court's decision therefore merits
a high degree of insulation from appellate revision.
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-18 (3rd Cir. 1981) (abuse of discretion standard not
appropriate where trial court's decision not based on first hand observation, but merely weigh-
ing of factors). However, if the reviewing court was not examining the first hand observations
of the trial judge, the appellate court need not defer to the findings of the trial court. Rosen-
berg, supra note 49, at 646. See, e.g., La Cage Aux Folles, 771 F.2d at 1271; Wyle v. R.J.
Reynolds Indus., 709 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1983); Baker v. Limber, 647 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1981);
Chism, 637 F.2d at 1331; G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.
1978); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
Napolitano v. Compania Sud Americana de Vapores, 421 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1970).
The NME 11 court correctly described the appellate deference given the trial court's ob-
servations of conduct of counsel. The circuit court strained to not afford Judge Coyle this
deference in a case involving government counsel. The Ninth Circuit in NME 11, instead
characterized the trial court's error as the inappropriate weighing of factors, thus avoiding the
typical appellate deference afforded the conduct of counsel.
110. NMEI, 107 F.R.D. at 631.
111. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-1512 (1982); see also United States v. Griffin, 463 F.2d 177
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which proscribes
"endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any [witness], in any court of the United
States," as fully applicable to prospective witnesses in matters pending in any federal court);
United States v. Wilson, 796 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 896 (1987) (at-
tempted witness tampering could be prosecuted even if the actions were not successful); United
States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 329 (1986) (finding that
§ 1512 could apply to improper influence towards any person even if proceeding is not
pending).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3) (Rule provides for use of depositions at trial if deponent
becomes unavailable).
113. J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROcEss 20-21 (1976).
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misconduct distinction. 14
The Ninth Circuit characterized the first two instances of govern-
ment misconduct in NME 11 as involving "roadblocks to information
during discovery""'5 while the charge underlying the dismissal order was
"improper influence of a trial witness during an interview just before she
testified.""' 6 The only link between the first two orders and the third
order, according to the court, was that the district judge found the con-
duct underlying all of them to be improper." 7 In so characterizing the
misconduct, the Ninth Circuit recast the issue presented as improper bal-
ancing of the relevant factors by the trial court. Thus, the court could
avoid the deference usually afforded the first hand observations of the
trial judge and could instead apply an objective test. Here again, the
Ninth Circuit hid behind its arbitrary pre/post trial distinctions as to the
precise type of government misconduct.
2. Due process
The NME 11 court stated that the trial court's first two orders did
not give the government fair warning that further misconduct would re-
sult in dismissal." 8 Thus, the court concluded that due process had not
been satisfied in this case. Courts have viewed due process as a flexible
concept which requires "such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands."" 9 The requirements of due process are generally
met if the court, before it imposes a sanction, provides the party with an
opportunity to explain its actions.' 20  The Ninth Circuit suggested that
the real issue in NME II was not whether the conduct underlying the
orders was improper, but whether the first two orders gave the govern-
ment "clear notice" that the conduct found in the third order would re-
sult in dismissal of the action.1
2 1
114. Additionally, in this situation it is appropriate for the court to examine the type of
misconduct giving rise to the court orders. Attempts to influence witnesses have been viewed
by other courts as particularly dangerous to the judicial process and the type of conduct which
should be dealt with in the harshest of terms. See infra notes 382-83 and accompanying text.
115. NME II, 792 F.2d at 912 (emphasis added).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id. To support its holding, the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court in NME I
could not rely on FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) or FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) to authorize the dismissal of
the action. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
118. "NME II, 792 F.2d at 912.
119. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972)).
120. Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32, 36 (3d Cir. 1979).
121. NME I1, 792 F.2d at 912; see also Professional Seminar Consultants, Inc. v. Sino Am.
Technology Exch. Council, Inc., 727 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984) (trial court entered order
to produce particular documents or risk having certain facts established); Rainbow Pioneer v.
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The NME H court cited In re Rubin 122 in support of this notice
requirement. 123 The Rubin court distinguished Fjelstad v. American
Honda Motor Co., 124 a case surprisingly analogous to the NME II case.
The Fjelstad trial court expressly warned the defendant that the court
was considering severe sanctions for defendant's failure to file interro-
gatory answers. 125 The Ninth Circuit found the district court's entry of
default judgment proper in Fjelstad, because the prior order of the court
was not unconstitutionally vague and consequently provided sufficient
notice to the parties. 126 The court in Rubin emphasized that a party
must be given some indication of how it failed to comply with the court's
order. 127
Contrary to the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in NME II, Judge
Coyle had threatened to dismiss the case if the DOJ misconduct contin-
ued. 28 Additionally, the DOJ attorneys were afforded an opportunity
for a full evidentiary hearing on the misconduct in question before the
case was dismissed. 129 Thus, under the Fjelstad rationale, the DOJ had
been given adequate notice and a full opportunity to be heard.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit stated that in order to satisfy due pro-
cess, a court imposed sanction must (1) be just; and (2) specifically relate
to the particular claim at issue in the discovery order.1 30 Further, when a
court imposes sanctions that interfere with a party's claim (e.g., dismis-
sal) due process concerns are not met if the sanctions are imposed merely
for punishment and not because the misconduct threatens to interfere
with the rightful decision in the case.131 This control requirement can be
satisfied by any act within the control of the party.
132
Hawaii-Nevada Inv. Corp., 711 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1983) (order to respond to interrogato-
ries and to produce documents contained warning that failure to comply would result in de-
fault); United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1980)
(court warned that unless interrogatories were answered by certain date, complaint would be
dismissed).
122. 769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the facts of Rubin.
123. Id. at 619; see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
124. 762 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985).
125. Id. at 1340.
126. Id.
127. Rubin, 769 F.2d at 616.
128. NMEI, 107 F.R.D. at 631.
129. Id. Generally some form of notice and hearing, whether formal or informal, is re-
quired before imposing a sanction. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972); see also Fruin,
When Lawyers Bend the Court Out of Shape, JUDGES' J., Fall 1982, at 14, 18-19.
130. Professional Seminar, 727 F.2d at 1474.
131. Wyle, 709 F.2d at 591; see also Fjelstad, 762 F.2d at 1340; Munoz-Santana v. I.N.S.,
742 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1984).
132. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Indus. et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
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In NME II, the misconduct of the government attorneys was within
their control because it consisted of comments made by the attorneys. In
fact, the conduct of the DOJ is a perfect example of the willful noncom-
pliance discussed by the Ninth Circuit in other cases.13 3 A court need
not find that the failure to comply with one of its orders was motivated
by a desire to impede the administration of justice.
34
The repeated attempts by the DOJ to block discovery or to influence
witnesses threatened to interfere with the proper decision in the NME II
case. Moreover, Judge Coyle afforded the government notice of the pos-
sibilitiy of dismissal and a full opportunity to explain their actions. 35
All the requirements of due process were complied with by the district
court in NME II.
3. Authority for dismissal
Deciding that the first two orders did not give sufficient warning of
dismissal, the NME II court held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
37 and 41 were not authority for dismissal of the suit. 136 The court of
appeals recognized that a district court has an inherent power to dismiss
an action to ensure the integrity of its orders and the orderly administra-
tion of justice.1 37 The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the trial
197 (1958). In Rogers, the plaintiff was unable to produce discovery documents because its
compliance would violate Swiss banking laws. Id. at 211. The Court distinguished between a
party's conscious decision not to produce documents and a party's inability to comply because
of circumstances beyond his control. Id. The Court found dismissal improper where noncom-
pliance was not willful. Id. at 212. Even noncompliance with a court order alone may be
sufficient to establish "fault." Cf Munoz-Santana, 742 F.2d at 564.
133. E.g., Rogers, 357 U.S. at 211-12; see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
134. Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 93 F.R.D. 848, 851 (D.R.I. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 12
(Ist Cir. 1983).
135. NME II also satisfies some additional factors of the due process analysis, not discussed
by the appellate court. The United States Supreme Court has declared that due process con-
siderations limit the use of sanctions as a punishment. In Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,
212 U.S. 322 (1909), the Court found that due process rights were protected where a default
judgment was entered against a defendant who refused to produce documents pursuant to a
court order. Id. at 351. Reasoning that the default was not "mere punishment," the Hain-
mond Court stated that Hammond had not shown the reasons for its failure to comply with
the court order. Id. at 350-51. Under this fairness rationale set forth by the Court, a party
who had failed to comply with a court order is treated as if he had chosen to abandon his claim
or defense. Comment, supra note 4, at 1041-42. Similarly, in NME II, the dismissal was not
mere punishment, but related to government counsel's violations of the district court's orders.
136. NME II, 792 F.2d at 912.
137. Id. (quoting Phoceene Sous-Marine S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806
(9th Cir. 1982)). The United States Supreme Court recognized that the inherent power of a
court is "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 873 (1962). In Link, the
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court's dismissal in this case constituted an abuse of discretion.1 38
The inherent powers of the federal courts have been described as
those powers "necessary to the exercise of all others." 13 9 Before relying
on their inherent power to dismiss a case, courts generally undergo a
two-prong analysis. 140 First, the court must decide if any sanction at all
is appropriate. That is, whether the alleged misconduct involved actions
undertaken in bad faith or conduct inconsistent with the orderly admin-
istration of justice.141 Second, the court must examine whether the mis-
conduct related to the matters in controversy in a way that interfered
with the rightful decision in the case.142 This second prong incorporates
the due process concerns that dismissal be used only in extreme
circumstances.
43
In setting forth the test in NME II, the Ninth Circuit ignored both
prongs. The court not only overlooked whether a sanction was appropri-
ate in the case, but also failed to examine whether the DOJ conduct
would have interfered with the rightful decision in the case. The court
instead found that the district court had erred by not considering a three-
part test. 44
4. Test proposed by the court
The court of appeals found that the district court abused its discre-
tion by not considering lesser sanctions, by not determining the prejudi-
cial effect of the government's conduct prior to dismissal and by not
weighing the public interest in an antitrust action. 145 However, each of
Court upheld the use of the inherent power of the lower court to dismiss an action sua sponte
for failure to prosecute. Id. at 633. Some years later, in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752 (1980), the Court again affirmed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
limit a court's inherent power "to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices."
Id. at 765. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the rationale of Link and Piper and has found that
"[i]t is firmly established that the courts have inherent power to dismiss an action or enter a
default judgment to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the integrity of their or-
ders." Phosmarine, 682 F.2d at 806 (citations omitted); accord Landis v. North Am. Co., 299
U.S. 248 (1936); Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1975); O'Brien
v. Sinatra, 315 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1963).
138. See supra notes 49 & 109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of
review.
139. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764-65 (citations omitted).
140. Felstad, 762 F.2d at 1338.
141. Id.
142. See Wyle, 709 F.2d at 589.
143. Id.; see North Am. Watch Corp. v. Princess Ermine Jewels, 786 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th
Cir. 1986); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Fjelstad, 762 F.2d at
1338; Wyle, 709 F.2d at 589; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
144. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
145. Id.
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these required factors were present in the trial court record. This result
in NME I1 indicates the apparent lengths to which a court will go to
uphold the actions of government counsel.
a. alternative sanctions
The Ninth Circuit first stated that Judge Coyle had erred by failing
to consider alternatives to dismissing the case. 146 The requirement that a
trial court consider alternative sanctions prior to dismissal ensures that
the sanction selected by the court will be the most effective in bringing
about the desired result.147 National Medical argued that the two earlier
orders were attempts by the district court to impose sanctions less drastic
than dismissal.148 Responding that the case was dismissed for a different
kind of misconduct, the circuit court held that the two earlier orders
were not attempts to impose lesser sanctions.
1 49
National Medical stressed that the record below indicated that the
district judge had considered and rejected other lesser sanctions at the
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissal.' 51 In fact, at that hearing, the
district judge asked government counsel what sanctions they would rec-
ommend if the court granted the defendants' motion.' 5 ' None of the
sanctions suggested by the government, in light of its repeated pattern of
misconduct, provided Judge Coyle with a suitable alternative to
dismissal.
1 52
Having raised the issue of alternative sanctions sua sponte, a district
court need not exhaust all possible sanctions before dismissing the
case.' 53 A district judge is only required to explore meaningful alterna-
146. Id.
147. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947).
148. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Appellees' Rehearing Brief, supra note 95, at 8 (quoting Record at 1065).
152. Id. at 9 (quoting Record at 1075-76). Government counsel suggested that instead of
dismissing the case, the court should impose formal guidelines on DOJ contact with witnesses,
exclude particular government attorneys from participating in the trial or require that the
senior government attorneys more closely supervise the junior attorneys. Id. National Medi-
cal analogized this last DOJ suggestion to "putting the wolves in to guard the chickens."
Appellees' Brief, supra note 31, at 45 (quoting Record at 1081).
153. Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1053-54
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 999 (1973). The
court in Von Poppenheiin stated that:
There are of course a wide variety of other sanctions short of dismissal that are avail-
able. The district judge, however, need not exhaust them all before finally dismissing
a case. The exercise of his discretion to dismiss requires only that possible and mean-
ingful alternatives be reasonably explored, bearing in mind the drastic foreclosure of
rights that dismissal effects.
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tives.' 54 The record in NME II contained evidence that the district court
had considered lesser sanctions prior to dismissal. The district court had
thus acted properly in examining and rejecting alternative sanctions
before dismissing the government's case.
b. prejudicial impact
The Ninth Circuit also stated that "the district court refused to con-
sider if National Medical had suffered any prejudice as a result of the
government's conduct." 155 Although the district court made no findings
of prejudice to National Medical, it is evident from the dismissal order
that the district court had considered the possible prejudice to National
Medical resulting from the government's misconduct. 156  The order
stated:
The defendants have and are faced with repeated attempts to
improperly influence witnesses in giving testimony in a matter
of great importance. While the government argues that there
has been no showing that the attempts were successful, such is
no longer the issue. Government's counsel will not be given free
rein to attempt to influence witnesses and if they happen to be
caught where the witness has in fact been influenced, only then
will the court assure that such activities will not continue.
1 5 7
The language of the order indicates that the district court was aware of
sufficient government misconduct so that a showing of prejudice was no
longer required. 151 Judge Coyle's reluctance to dismiss the action at the
time he issued the second protective order, because "there ha[d] been no
Id. at 1053-54 (footnote omitted); see also Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522 (9th Cir.
1976).
154. See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981) (where district
court explored reasonable alternative sanctions, dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure held not an abuse of discretion). But see Tolbert v.
Leighton, 623 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1980) (where only evidence of dilatoriness was party's failure
to attend pretrial conference, abuse of discretion to dismiss case for failure to prosecute with-
out first considering less drastic sanctions).
155. NME I1, 792 F.2d at 913.
156. The district court's findings are generally to be liberally construed to "uphold, rather
than defeat [the] judgment." Wells Benz, Inc. v. United States, 333 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir. 1964)
(quoting Clyde Equip. Co. v. Fiorito, 16 F.2d 106, 109 (9th Cir. 1926)). Furthermore, there is
no requirement that the trial court commit its consideration of alternative, lesser sanctions to
writing. See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, the oral examination of
alternative sanctions by Judge Coyle in NME I was proper and satisfied the Ninth Circuit's
requirement.
157. NME I, 107 F.R.D. at 632 (emphasis added).
158. In fact, Judge Coyle believed, when he issued his second order, there had been a suffi-
cient violation of the intent of the first protective order to warrant dismissal. May 21, 1985
Order, supra note 35, at 4.
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showing ... of any actual influence of any of the witnesses," further
supports this conclusion.' 59 By ultimately dismissing the case, the dis-
trict court was satisfied that the government's misconduct had exceeded
the level that the district court would tolerate.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit itself recognized in NME I1 that "a
showing of prejudice or irreparable harm" was not required prior to dis-
missal. The relevant factor on review, instead, was whether the court
had considered the issue of prejudice prior to dismissal. 6 ' The district
court in NME H considered the prejudice to National Medical before
159. Id. at 4-5. The court requested that National Medical "bring conduct of the type set
forth [in the second order] to the court's attention." Id.
160. The cases cited by the Ninth Circuit in NMEII support the requirement that prejudice
need not actually be proven. For example, in Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.
1986), the Ninth Circuit declared that lack of prejudice to defendants was not determinative
where the integrity of court orders was involved. Id. at 1425. The court in Henderson noted
that "although no specific showing of prejudice to defendants is made, the integrity of the
district court is involved ... [and] we cannot find that a lack of prejudice to defendants is
determinative." Id. In Henderson, the district court warned the plaintiff four times that his
dilatory preparation would not be tolerated. The court examined: (1) the policy favoring liti-
gation on the merits; (2) whether prejudice was shown; and (3) whether less severe sanctions
were considered. Id. at 1423. Because the Henderson case was a dismissal for failure to prose-
cute, the circuit court also analyzed the district court's need to manage its docket, and the
court's interest in expeditiously resolving litigation. Id. The Henderson court emphasized that
the appellate court should not view the conduct in a vacuum. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held in
Henderson that a showing of prejudice was not necessary prior to dismissal. Id. at 1424.
The Henderson court distinguished Mir v. Fosburg, 706 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1983), where
the plaintiff had failed to file any documents with the court even though they had been served
on defendants. The Ninth Circuit ruled that it was error to dismiss the case without evidence
of the trial court considering lesser sanctions or a showing of prejudice to defendants. Id. at
918-19. The Henderson court noted, however, that the Mir case was actually reversed on due
process grounds because the plaintiff in Mir had received no warnings prior to dismissal of his
case. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1425.
The Henderson court approvingly cited Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984). In
Ash, the Ninth Circuit clarified that a party need not show actual prejudice, but rather must
show that the trial court balanced the various factors. Id. at 496. The court in Henderson
relied on Ash in stating that the district judge was in the best position to determine the effects
of the party's misconduct and to sanction accordingly. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424.
The court in Raiford v. Pounds used a similar analysis. 640 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam). In Raiford, the court determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it
dismissed an action where neither prejudice had been shown nor alternative sanctions had been
considered. Id. at 945. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit was prepared to infer prejudice, in several
other cases, to uphold a harsh sanction. See, e.g., Rubin, 769 F.2d at 619 (although finding of
prejudice not determinative where party affirmatively stated that it was ready for trial in spite
of the misconduct, dismissal was improper because party had no warning that court would
dismiss); Wyle, 709 F.2d at 589 (irreparable harm to adverse party merely one factor that
should be weighed by trial court in determining proper sanction); Sumitomo, 617 F.2d at 1370
(party's delay for eighteen months in providing court ordered discovery caused "unmistaka-
ble" prejudice); Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1980) (court inferred that
defendants were prejudiced by plaintiff's inability to file intelligible complaint); States Steam-
ship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 804 (9th Cir. 1970) (dismissal for failure to
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issuing the second order and again before issuing the dismissal order.
The district court had satisfied this second factor imposed by the Ninth
Circuit.
c. public interest
The last requirement set forth by the NME II court was that the
district court weigh the public interest concerns in a case "benefiting the
citizenry as a whole."16' While focusing on the rights of society, the
court did not clearly define "public interest." The court did discuss the
policy favoring trial on the merits of a case and the policy against depriv-
ing a party of his day in court. 162 However, the court's view of what
constitutes the "public interest" is much too limited. The appellate
court's analysis neglected to consider the other interests of the public, in
addition to litigation on the merits, that must be considered before a
court may dismiss an action.
In discussing the public interest, the Ninth Circuit referred to the
obvious interest of the citizenry to have the benefit of the laws. 163 When
Congress passes laws to accomplish certain goals, a case brought to en-
force those goals should not be thrown out merely because of govern-
ment attorney misconduct."6 The rationale set forth by the Ninth
Circuit in NME II overlooked language from an earlier opinion that
" 'the public interest requires not only that Court orders be obeyed but
further that Governmental agencies which are charged with the enforce-
ment of laws should set the example of compliance with Court or-
ders.' ,165 Thus, the NME 1I court should have been concerned not just
with enforcing the laws to benefit society, but also with ensuring that
prosecute does not require specific findings regarding prejudice to defendants because law will
presume injury from unreasonable delay).
161. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
162. Id.; see also Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1975).
163. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
164. Id. This public interest requirement set out by the NME 11 court creates a nebulous
and unworkable standard. Commentators have already criticized "public interest" as having
no meaning to guide government action. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1683 (1975). However, some have recognized a public
interest to have government lawyers providently manage a litigation and not waste the public's
funds or time. H. SHRIVER, THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER 127 (1975). The "public interest"
standard, in fact, may be little more than a term used to disguise the process of allocating
valuable benefits. See Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1235-36
(1966).
165. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913; Sumitomo, 617 F.2d at 1370 (quoting Perry v. Golub, 74
F.R.D. 360, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1976)).
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government officials obey the laws that they enforce. 166
Further, the Ninth Circuit stated that there is a "public interest" in
allowing a case to proceed to a trial on the merits whenever possible.'
67
While this view is reflected in a number of decisions,16 8 many courts have
begun to recognize its flaws. 16 9 When a court overlooks misconduct and
allows a lawsuit to proceed to trial on the merits, the court protects the
wrongdoer at the expense of the innocent party.17 ° Public interest in-
cludes the idea that a party not profit by his noncompliance with a court
order. 17' Consequently, a public interest also exists in protecting the in-
nocent defendant from harassing litigation and the misconduct of
others.172 In NME II, the government's misconduct, if left unpenalized,
would have punished National Medical in its preparation of the case.
173
Attempts to influence witnesses and block the fact-finding process can
taint the entire proceeding and prevent a fair trial.
Maintaining the court's right to preserve the integrity of its orders is
an equally important public policy.' 7 4 The public perception of the judi-
166. The laws that a government attorney must follow may originate from congressional
enactments, professional ethical canons or court orders.
167. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958).
168. See, e.g., Ash, 739 F.2d at 496; Mir, 706 F.2d at 918; Ace Novelty Co. v. Gooding
Amusement Co., 664 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1981); Raiford, 640 F.2d at 945.
169. E.g., Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Mir, 706 F.2d at 918; Van Bronkhorst, 529 F.2d at
950; Von Poppenheim, 442 F.2d at 1051.
170. Von Poppenheim, 442 F.2d at 1053-54 (court must consider defendant's right to be free
from costly and harrassing litigation).
171. Sumitomo, 617 F.2d at 1370.
172. Al Barnett & Son, 611 F.2d at 36. In Von Poppenheim, the court stated that:
Here the district judge made such reasonable opportunities and alternatives available
to plaintiff that the dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. Somewhere along the
line, the rights of the defendants to be free from costly and harrassing litigation must
be considered. So too must the time and energies of our courts and the rights of
would-be litigants awaiting their turns to have other matters resolved. The exact
point on that line is incapable of exact definition, but we are satisfied that the present
case went beyond it.
442 F.2d at 1053-54.
173. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. This "litigation on the merits" philos-
ophy, as adopted by the NME II court, has been criticized as "dull[ing] the cutting edge of
sanctions intended to enforce compliance with procedural rules." Rosenberg, supra note 167,
at 480. The judicial preoccupation with reaching the merits of every lawsuit weakens judges'
ability to require that parties appearing before them play fairly or lose. Id. This view also
ignores the numerous temptations to bend or evade the rules when preparing for and con-
ducting a trial. Id. The effect of this philosophy is often to tolerate misconduct for the sake of
proceeding to trial.
174. Professional Seminar, 727 F.2d at 1470 (balance of competing public and private inter-
ests in dismissing a case should be strnck in favor of court's interest in efficiency, compliance
with its orders and deterrence); see also Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 264, 268 (1979).
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cial system is always at issue when attorneys ignore court orders.17 5 To
protect the integrity of court orders, the Supreme Court has recognized
the deterrence value of sanctions.1 76 Thus, the public benefits when the
courts are able to maintain the flow of cases and protect their own
sanctity.
As structured by the appellate court, the public interest requirement
would seldom be surmounted if the government were a party to the law-
suit. Ostensibly, all acts of the government are in the public interest. 177
When dealing with federally employed lawyers, commentators often state
that "the client is the public interest."1 7'  The activities of the govern-
ment almost always benefit a large number of citizens. In essence, the
court has created a standard that does not easily transfer to a private
litigant because this public interest element is generally not present in
private litigation.179
As stated, many public interests exist beyond those identified by the
court in NME Ir. The "public interest" test constructed by the Ninth
Circuit is too narrow and neglects important policy concerns. However,
even if the circuit court's test is applied, the district court in NME II
complied with the requirement that it consider the public interest. 8'
175. Chism, 637 F.2d at 1332.
176. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court in Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
874 (1976) (per curiam), first condoned this general/specific deterrent distinction. In that
case, the Court stated that the purpose of sanctions was "not merely to penalize those whose
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted
to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent ... [so that] other parties to other lawsuits
would... [not] flout other.., orders of other district courts." 427 U.S. at 643.
177. J. Fleishman, Keynote Address: The Pursuit of Self-Interest for the Public Good: An
Ethical Paradox of Representative Democracy (June 16-19, 1982), reprinted in THE ROSCOE
POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, FINAL REPORT: ETHICS AND GOVERN-
MENT 27 (1982). Professor Fleishman analogized the role of a public official to that of a
trustee of the public trust. Relying on basic trust law, he maintained that the government
official is to always conduct himself for the benefit of the beneficiary, the public.
178. See, e.g., Lawry, Who is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of
the Wrong Question, FED. B.J. Fall 1978, at 61, 64 [hereinafter Lawry I].
179. Some examples of "public interest" being a factor in a case other than a suit with the
government include: private antitrust, class action and public interest cases. Several commen-
tators, however, advocate injecting a public interest element into the conduct of all attorneys,
whether public or private. See, e.g., Rauh, The Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest,
reprinted in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE (1985).
180. In NME I, Judge Coyle noted that the case before him was a "matter of great impor-
tance." 107 F.R.D. at 632. Implicit in that phrase is the court's recognition that the substan-
tive issues at stake in the lawsuit were not those found in an ordinary lawsuit. Id.
The public interest analysis, however, as applicable to this case, raises some interesting
issues. First, the government never raised this issue of "great public concern" at the district
court level. See G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1978)
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5. Glaring omissions
The most remarkable feature of the NME 11 case is the cursory
treatment the court gave to the fact that the misconduct was undertaken
by government attorneys.'' National Medical cited United States v.
Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance Co. 182 to support its argument that a
more demanding standard of conduct was warrranted when misconduct
was undertaken by government attorneys. 18 3 The Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged that the "status of the government attorney is unique," but
summarily rejected any other similarity between NME II and
Sumitomo.184
("Since this objection to the dismissal was not asserted below, it may not be raised for the first
time on this appeal.").
Second, and more importantly, the government had failed to take the steps necessary to
preserve the trial court's ability to award the relief requested by the government. In an anti-
trust action, where the acquisition has already been consummated, the government typically
obtains a "hold separate order." J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE TRADE
REGULATION § 15.02[2] (1987). Before issuing this type of order, the trial court requires that
the government establish the prima facie merits of its case. Id. After accepting that proof, the
court orders the defendant to take no further steps regarding the acquisition that is the subject
of the antitrust suit. In so doing, the hold separate order preserves the individual identities of
the various assets in question. This also allows the court to order a divestiture if it ultimately
finds a violation of the antitrust laws. See FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir.
1980); United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196 (N.D.N.Y. 1979);
United States v. Acorn Engineering Co., Trade Cas. (CCH) % 64,197 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
In this case, however, the government did not seek a "hold separate order" even though
National Medical had already acquired the second hospital. Appellees' Rehearing Brief, supra
note 95, at 12. Believing the government could not meet its burden of proof to obtain the
order, National Medical refused to voluntarily hold the two hospitals separately. Id. Thus,
the government's inaction resulted in a consummated acquisition and an irrevocable combina-
tion of services between the two hospitals. Id. Little harm has been done to the public interest
by dismissing the NME II case since there is now no ultimate remedy in the case. The actions
and statements of the district court indicated that it was aware of the public interests involved
in the case.
181. Yet another anomaly in the NMEII case was the Ninth Circuit's refusal to rely on any
precedent from outside the circuit for the standard of government attorney conduct. In stating
that "National Medical cites no precedent in this circuit that would support such a proposi-
tion," the court ignored language of other courts which have addressed the special role of the
government attorney. See, e.g., infra note 214, and accompanying text. This statement by the
circuit court is odd, not only because other jurisdictions freely rely on each other for persua-
sive authority, but because the Ninth Circuit, in its Sumitomo opinion, approvingly adopted
the reasoning and language of an opinion from a district court in the First Circuit. In fact, the
language quoted by the court in Sumitomo was: "[T]he public interest requires not only that
Court orders be obeyed but further that Governmental agencies which are charged with the
enforcement of laws should set the example of compliance with Court orders." Stumitomo, 617
F.2d at 1370 (quoting Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1976)).
182. 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the facts of Sumitomo, see supra
note 102.
183. NME II, 792 F.2d at 913.
184. Id. Interestingly, Judge Wallace authored both the Sumitomo and NME II opinions.
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Superficially distinguishing Sumitomo, the Ninth Circuit case most
closely on point, the court implicitly addressed the exact issue it hoped to
avoid-the proper standard by which to judge government attorney con-
duct. The NME II court stated that Sumitomo stood for the need for
harsh sanctions against the government to punish misconduct. 185 Yet,
the court declared that a government attorney was not to be held to a
different standard for dismissal purposes.186
In NME II, the court deliberately distinguished between harsh sanc-
tions for disobeying a court order, as in Sumitomo, and the standard of
compliance for dismissal purposes, as in NME II. This distinction is spe-
cious at best. In Sumitomo, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that pre-
cluding a party from introducing evidence could be tantamount to
dismissal. I87
Contradictory language in the NME II opinion leaves district courts
with little guidance regarding the appropriate test to apply in future
cases. On one hand, the Ninth Circuit held that a trial court may prop-
erly impose harsh sanctions when the government misbehaves. On the
other hand, the court also stated that the trial court must not apply a
different standard for compliance or dismissal purposes. This may mean
that all litigants are now held to a higher standard. More likely, the
court is actually holding government attorneys to a less demanding stan-
dard than required of private attorneys. The court accomplished this in
part by requiring district courts to consider the public interest involved
in a case, a concern rarely found in private litigation.188
The question regarding the proper standard to be applied to a gov-
ernment attorney was given little consideration by the NME II court.
While this issue should have been dispositive of the case, the court in-
stead formulated an artificial distinction between discovery and trial mis-
conduct. Part of the problem faced by the NME II court in dealing with
government attorney misconduct was that no formalized standards for
civil government attorney behavior exist.189 A clearly articulated stan-
Therefore, this is not a situation where there are differing results due to different judges' under-
standing of the precedent.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Sumitomo, 617 F.2d at 1369.
188. See supra note 179.
189. Several commentators in this area have noted the special position of the government
attorney and the need for increased vigilance. The government attorney is not only an officer
of the court but, more importantly, a representative of the public and possesses a high public
responsibility. H. SHRIVER, supra note 164, at 144. Our system will not tolerate the exercise
of governmental power without proper procedural safeguards. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 18 (1965). The general purpose of sanctions is to deter miscon-
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dard that will be applied to the conduct of government attorneys should
be formulated now.
B. Why There Should be a Special Standard
for a Government Attorney
1. Historical status of the government attorney
The special position of an attorney representing the sovereign has
been acknowledged throughout history.19° Traditionally, both the law
and the government grew out of the monarchy and the class system.19 '
Hence, the sovereign had discretion, while his ministers had to do strictly
as they were told. 192
During the colonial period in this country, the colonies had their
crown counsel, their solicitors and their attorneys general. 193 The attor-
neys general appeared in court on behalf of the crown, advised colonial
officials, instituted suits and handled criminal cases. When the federal
government was established, Congress provided in the Judiciary Act of
1789191 for an attorney general to prosecute and conduct suits and to
duct. Greater sanctions work as a greater deterrent and put attorneys on notice that they are
being held to a higher standard.
190. English common law recognized a series of prerogatives, or doctrines of public policy,
one of which stated the general rule that "where an act of Parliament is made for the public
good .... the public interest should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officers, to
whose care they are confided." See, e.g., CHrrTY, LAW OF PREROGATIVES 379 (1789).
The United States Supreme Court adopted the English common law prerogatives. United
States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878) (holding that public interest must be protected
even "[i]n a representative government, where the people do not and cannot act in a body,
where their power is delegated to others, and must of necessity be exercised by them, if exer-
cised at all .... ); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938);
United States v. Buford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 12 (1830). The Thompson Court found that when the
colonies achieved independence, they had adopted the English prerogatives including the one
dealing with the negligence of public officers. Thompson, 98 U.S. at 489; see also United States
v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 301, 315 (1840).
Merely because a rule was once part of the common law, however, does not prevent the
courts from changing or retracting it. For instance, as Justice Holmes recognized, the com-
mon law is not static, but reflects the necessities of the time as well as the prevalent moral and
political theories and public policy. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 32-33 (1963). Justice
Holmes also pointed out that while the law reflects its past, the substance of the law corre-
sponds to present convenience. Id. Similarly, Justice Cardozo noted that judges may not
make and unmake laws at will. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66-67
(1949). Instead, he believed that a court should consider logic, history and custom in shaping
the law because the welfare of society must be a court's paramount concern. Id. at 67. Justice
Cardozo believed the most important social value was to insure that the laws were uniform and
impartial. Id. at 112-13.
191. M. DIMOCK, LAW AND DYNAMIC ADMINSTRATION 129-30 (1980).
192. Id.
193. H. SHRIVER, supra note 164, at 127.
194. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
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advise the President and the executive branch.195 The further develop-
ment of the government attorney positions was slow. The first full-time
Attorney General was not appointed until 1853;196 the DOJ was not es-
tablished until 1870.197
Even from these early times, the government attorney's role was
viewed as one that balanced discretion and control. 198 One Attorney
General described his position as "not properly political, but strictly.
legal; and it is my duty.., to uphold the law, and resist all encroach-
ments from whatever quarter of mere will or power." '19 9 In fact, in 1904,
Teddy Roosevelt wrote to his Attorney General that "[o]f all the officers
of the government, those in the Department of Justice should be kept
most free from suspicion of improper action .... 200
Additionally, from the beginnings of the nation, the people have
been recognized as the "sovereign. ' 20 1 This ideal gave rise to the basic
tenets of American democracy. The people were given the power over
the political branch of government through the ballot.20 2 In the United
States, the people must exert control over the activities of government.
In the same way, the government must exercise restraint and discretion
in its use of power, especially where the public officers are not under
direct democratic control.2 °3
2. Current trends
Congress and the courts have reconsidered the position of the gov-
ernment as a litigant in the American judicial system. Until recently,
statutes specifically prohibited courts from awarding either fees or costs
195. H. SHRIVER, supra note 164, at 127.
196. Id. at 128. Until this time, Attorneys General were expected to devote some of their
time to their public duties and the rest of their time to the private practice of law. Id.
197. Id. When the DOJ was created in 1870, its purpose was to (1) ensure uniformity of
opinion, to prevent conflicts from office to office, and (2) prevent parochialism in departments
so that advice would not be given to bolster decisions already made. D. HOROWiTz, THE
JUROCRACY 13 (1977).
198. H. SHRIVER, supra note 164, at 134-35. The Department of Justice has been described
as the "barrister" of the United States government. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, supra note 197,
at 6.
199. H. SHRIVER, supra note 164, at 136 (quoting Edward Bates, Attorney General to
Abraham Lincoln) (emphasis in orginal).
200. Id. at 136.
201. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 57 (P. Bradley ed., H. Reeves trans.
1945) (in America, fact that people are sovereign is recognized by both law and custom); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); see also Johnson, John A. Sibley Lecture: The Role of the
Judiciary with Respect to the Other Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455, 465 (1977).
202. W. LECKY, DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY 76-77 (1896). In contrast, the English version
relied on the existence of an identifiable unitary sovereign. L. JAFFE, supra note 189, at 197.
203. Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
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against the government. In 1966, Congress repealed Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(f) so that the costs of litigation could be awarded
against the United States under the same standards that apply to a pri-
vate party.2° Congress also passed a statute in 1980 to allow courts to
award attorney's fees against the government.2" 5
Similarly, Congress has increasingly eroded the sovereign immunity
of the United States.20 6 The passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) exemplifies this trend.20 7 The FTCA holds the government lia-
ble for the negligence of its employees. Traditional reasons for maintain-
ing sovereign immunity, such as protecting the stability of the
government, have yielded to demands to treat citizens fairly vis-a-vis the
government.2 °s
Another step in Congress' attempts to make public bureaucracies
more accountable to the American people occurred in 1976 when Con-
gress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act (Act).20 9 The Act de-
clared that "the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information
regarding the decision-making processes of the Federal Government. '210
Judges have used these new statutes to equalize the position of the
government in relation to other parties.21 While commentators do not
agree on the reasons for this change in the treatment of the govern-
ment,2 12 they recognize a trend to subject governmental acts to increased
204. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(f), repealed by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1966).
205. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (Sept. 26, 1980) at 8-9, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4953, 4986-87 [hereinafter H.R. REP.]. The Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982), allows for attorney's fees to be awarded
against the federal government. Part of the express intent of this legislation was to place the
federal government on "completely equal footing" with private litigants who manifest bad
faith or willful disregard of court orders. H.R. REP., supra, at 8-9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG, &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4986-87; see also S.E.R., Jobs for Progress, Inc. v. United States, 759 F.2d I,
7 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (clear intent of Congress will undo any traditional royal privilege that had
been adopted).
206. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the government may not be sued
unless it has consented to be sued by waiving its immunity from suit.
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
208. W. ZIEGLER, JR., THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORIES OF OLIVER WENDALL
HOLMES 204, 216 (1969).
209. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c) (1982).
210. Id. at Declaration of Policy and Statement of Purpose. See generally Thomas, The
Courts and the Implementation of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 259
(1985); GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT, SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
211. See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 205, at 9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS at
4987 (courts impose costs and fees against the government).
212. Many commentators believe this change in attitude mirrors the disillusionment shared
by the country in discovering the criminal conduct undertaken or condoned by government
officials during the Watergate incident. See Comment, Removing Politics From the Justice
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scrutiny.213
3. Public view of government attorneys
a. power wielded
Courts have noted that the public gives special weight to the com-
ments and actions of government counsel.214 In fact, Judge Coyle, in
NME II, expressed concern that the DOJ attorneys were not sufficiently
sensitive to the fact that "requests" from government counsel carried
more weight than similar requests from private lawyers.215 A govern-
ment attorney wields a great deal of power; more than that of an attorney
in the private sector.
First, the average citizen is more likely to comply with a govern-
Department: Constitutional Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366
(1975).
213. Cf. Frankfurter, The Government Lawyer, 19 FED. B.J. 24 (1958). Frankfurter argued
that there are fundamental differences between the private practioner and the government at-
torney. One such difference is that the government lawyer represents the people of the United
States, not the narrow view of a particular client. Id. at 27. As a result, Frankfurter believed
that the federal attorney had a duty to insure that "justice" was being done. Id. at 28. This
difference between private and public attorneys requires greater vigilance on the part of the
government attorney in carrying out his or her responsibilities. Id. at 27.
214. See, e.g., Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[t]here is,
indeed, much to suggest that government counsel have a higher duty to uphold because their
client is not only the agency they represent but also the public at large"); Douglas v. Donovan,
704 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (counsel's "obligation to ensure that the tribunal is
aware of significant events that may bear directly on the outcome of litigation.., is especially
true for government attorneys, who have special responsibilities to both this court and the
public at large"); Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1976) ("the public interest
requires not only that Court orders be obeyed but further that Governmental agencies which
are charged with the enforcement of laws should set the example of compliance with Court
orders"); Jones v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 1250, 1256 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("counsel for the
United States has a special responsibility to the justice system"); Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Comm'n v. Datapoint Corp., 457 F. Supp. 62, 65 n.10 (W.D. Tex. 1978) ("[b]ecause of the
peculiar power of the government litigator, he is subject to ethical considerations beyond the
ordinary litigator"); cf. Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d 1244, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1984) (highly
prejudicial remarks by state attorney during closing argument "would not have been proper if
he had been a private attorney representing private clients; but it was even worse for a state
officer to act in this way. The ethics of the public's lawyers should be above reproach."). In
addition, the Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes the inherent power of government
attorneys and admonishes against civil government attorneys using their position or the eco-
nomic power of the government to bring about unjust results. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1982).
215. May 18, 1984 Order, supra note 27, at 3 n.2. The court's opinion goes on to quote the
declaration of a witness in the case which stated: "I agreed to cooperate with Mr. Boote's
request because he was a DOJ lawyer.... [I]t is extremely doubtful that I would have cooper-
ated with identical requests made by a private party .. " Id.; see supra note 30.
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ment attorney's demands.2 6 Judge Coyle determined that many of the
DOJ requests were complied with because, according to one witness, the
directives were made by the government and he assumed that these de-
mands were "proper., 217 Therefore, a government attorney's power
arises partly because citizens expect the government to act properly.
Second, the federally employed lawyer has tremendous resources at
his command.218 Congress recognized that the federal government with
its "greater resources and expertise" could often coerce a party into sub-
mitting to the government's position.21 9 When these forces are focused
against a private litigant, the effects can be devastating both financially
and psychologically.
22°
Third, a government attorney, as a public official, is a keeper of the
public trust.2 21 This concept is based on society's belief that a public
official will devote himself solely to the public good.222 This public trust
and public reliance demands a higher level of conduct from government
attorneys.223 Taken together, the power, resources and public trust com-
pel increased scrutiny with respect to the activities of government
attorneys.
b. conflict of interest
Increased scrutiny of government attorneys is required not only be-
cause of the power wielded by these lawyers, but also because no mecha-
nism is available to ensure that the interests of the "client" are being
protected. Attempting to identify a government attorney's client gives
rise to several problems, including conflicts of interest.224 Many com-
216. See supra note 30; see also Schwartz & Jacoby, Litigation with the Federal Government,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE § 1.124 (1975).
217. May 18, 1984 Order, supra note 27, at 3 n.2. Judge Coyle found that four witnesses
had refused to grant interviews to National Medical because of the government's conduct and
influence. Id. at 4.
218. Congress has recognized the resources and expertise that the federal government may
draw upon. See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 205, at 8, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 4986.
219. Id.
220. In passing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), Congress recognized the severe costs to an individual
of litigating with the federal government. Id. at 8, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 4988.
221. Frankfurter, supra note 213, at 31-32; see supra note 177.
222. Frankfurter, supra note 213, at 31-32.
223. Cf id. at 28.
224. This Note will focus on the problems identifying the client of an attorney working for
the Department of Justice. There are, however, many situations in which the client of a gov-
ernment attorney is easily identified. For example, a military attorney defending a serviceman
during a court-martial could easily identify whose legal interest he or she represents and a
typical attorney-client relationship would exist. Lawry I, supra note 178, at 63.
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mentators have reached differing conclusions as to whom the govern-
ment attorney actually represents.225 At least four different possibilities
exist. The government attorney may represent: (1) society or the public
at large; (2) the government itself, as a self-contained bureaucracy;
(3) the agency or department where the attorney works; or (4) the super-
visors of the attorney.226
If one subscribes to the position that the government attorney repre-
sents the agency where he or she works, in some instances an inherent
conflict will be present between the goals of the department and the goals
of the public at large.227 In these cases, the federally employed lawyer
would be torn between his obligations to do "justice and fairness" 22 and
his duty to pursue the specific goals of the agency.229 The same inherent
conflict is present when a federally employed attorney is viewed as repre-
senting the government as a whole.23° The government attorney must
recognize the "larger interest at stake . . . which may ... ultimately
distort or retard the achievement of a greater goal.
231
The generally accepted premise is that the client is the person whose
legal problem the attorney represents.232 Consequently, a typical attor-
ney-client relationship has mechanisms to ensure that the client's inter-
ests are being represented. One such mechanism is the ability of the
client to hire or fire the private attorney. A client is free to fire the pri-
vate attorney for misconduct.
Even when attorney misconduct has occurred, courts have been re-
luctant to "visit the sins of the attorney on the innocent client. '2 33 Gen-
225. See, eg., Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C.L. REV. 625, 632
(1979) [hereinafter Lawry II]. Most observers define the client of a government attorney as
being either the public as a whole or as the government agency where the attorney works.
Compare Frankfurter, supra note 213, at 27 (stating that client of government attorney is "the
people of the United States"); with Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32
REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 649, 650 (1977) (government attorney has duty to represent agency
where he works) and Professional Ethics Committee, Federal Bar Association, The Govern-
ment Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973) (attorney's profes-
sional obligations are to agency where he is employed) [hereinafter Professional Ethics
Committee].
226. Lawry II, supra note 225, at 632.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 634.
229. Id. at 634-35.
230. See Kleindienst, The Federal Attorney's Position Within the Government, 32 FED. B.J.
1, 8-9 (1973). Similar to a private attorney, the government attorney also has the tension
between representing the interests of his client and serving as an officer of the court. Id.
231. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of the United
States Before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REV. 527, 527 (1969).
232. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983).
233. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 873 (1962); see also
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erally, when a private party is involved, the trial judge must believe that a
reasonable client would have known that the attorney was not doing his
or her job before it will impose sanctions on a private litigant.2 34 The
client has selected a private attorney of his or her own free will and thus,
must bear the consequences.235 When a government attorney is involved,
however, the public did not select the lawyer, and cannot fire the attor-
ney for misconduct. 236 Thus, this aspect of client control is not present
for a government attorney.
The fact that the public cannot hire or fire a government attorney
presents a potential conflict in the motivations of government attorneys.
While a private attorney has goals of monetary rewards237 or at least
client retention, the government attorney has neither. A government
lawyer does not worry about losing a client or decreasing his or her com-
pensation due to the outcome of the case.2 38 Government attorneys must
be motivated by other factors. Quite often, the goal of doing justice be-
comes tarnished and the government attorneys are encouraged to merely
win.
2 3 9
The government attorney has two roles which are complementary of
each other: advocate for the public and officer of the court.240 The fed-
eral attorney must be especially conscious of these two roles and respon-
sive to each.24 Both the government lawyer and the court have the same
employer-the public.24 2 As such, the government attorney must be sen-
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 70-79 (1981).
234. See Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34; Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16 (Ist
Cir. 1983).
235. Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34; United Artists Corp. v. La Cage Aux Folles, Inc., 771 F.2d
1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1985); Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th
Cir. 1981).
236. Lawry I, supra note 178, at 69. Some government attorneys, such as district attorneys,
are often elected positions which offer the opportunity for public feedback through the ballot
box. This Note, however, is limited to the federal government attorney who is not elected,
such as those employed by the Department of Justice. For a discussion of the structure of the
Department of Justice, see D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, GOVERNMENT LITIGATION 10
(1963).
237. "Monetary rewards" is used here to include contingent fee arrangements.
238. Cf. vom Baur, Care and Feeding of Government Lawyers, 56 A.B.A. J. 668, 671 (1970).
239. Frankfurter, supra note 213, at 24, 27. In fact, the motto of the Department of Justice
declares that "the United States wins its point whenever Justice is done its citizen in the
courts." Id.; cf. Comment, supra note 212, at 367-68.
240. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
595, 595 (1986).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 596.
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sitive to the values embodied in the opponent's side of the lawsuit.2 43 In
fact, every time the federal lawyer files suit, he or she is obligated to take
into account the public resources that will be consumed by the case.2"
Without clear controls on government attorneys' conduct, misdi-
rected public servants can neglect their public duties and focus on imme-
diate agency goals. The actions of government attorneys must be held to
higher scrutiny since there is no effective mechanism to ensure that the
interests of the people are being represented.
4. Analogies to the criminal justice system
a. prosecutorial misconduct
Similar conflicts of interest are present for federal prosecutors.
While courts have not focused on federal civil attorneys' behavior, many
courts have examined the effects of prosecutorial misconduct.
Prosecutorial misconduct and overreaching, which many commen-
tators consider rampant in the American criminal justice system, have
long been a cause of concern.24 In 1935, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in the landmark
case of Berger v. United States.246 In Berger, the prosecutor made inap-
propriate remarks during cross-examination and closing arguments.247
The Court emphasized that the prosecutor was not the representative of
an ordinary party to the controversy, but was a representative of the sov-
ereign and had a duty to look beyond the confines of the particular case
to make sure that justice was done.248 The Berger requirement that the
prosecutor seek a higher goal has become a common theme in analyzing
prosecutorial misconduct cases. The responsibility of representing the
sovereign means that the prosecutor is held to unique standards of
behavior.249
Prosecutors have virtually unbridled discretion in the exercise of
their duties.250 Prosecutors have discretion whether to investigate, indict
243. Id.
244. Id. This also means weighing the good that will be achieved as a result of the action
against the costs or other disadvantages. Id.
245. See, e.g., Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX.
L. REv. 629 (1972).
246. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
247. Id. at 85.
248. Id. at 88; cf. Lawry II, supra note 225, at 634.
249. Adlerstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and Federal Courts. Some Recent Problems, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 755 (1978).
250. NATIONAL DIsTRICT ATrORNEYS ASSOCIATION, THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 3
(P. Healy, ed. 1971).
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or prosecute a suspect.251 Courts demand more from the prosecutors
than mere diligence in the performance of their public duties because of
this power; the virtuous and honorable exercise of power is required.
252
The most common types of prosecutorial misconduct involve at-
tempts to influence the factfinder with inadmissible evidence.25 3 These
include: referring to the defendant's failure to testify, expressing per-
sonal opinion on the defendant's guilt, arguing facts not in evidence,
making inflammatory arguments and appealing to bias or prejudice.254
Surprisingly, courts have developed few standards to deal with such
prosecutorial misconduct and proceed on a virtually ad hoc basis. 255
Commentators place some of the blame for prosecutorial miscon-
duct on the fact that courts seldom sufficiently reprimand prosecutors for
misconduct. 256 In fact, courts often require a substantial showing of re-
versible error before overturning a conviction.257 Thus, courts will often
examine the conduct complained of, yet find the prosecutor's behavior is
harmless error and impose no sanction. Observers have become increas-
ingly concerned that the prosecutor may in this way actually be re-
251. J. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 11 (1985).
252. Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the
ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1145, 1159-60 (1973).
253. Alsehuler, supra note 245, at 633.
254. Id. at 633-34. The problem of over-zealous prosecutors litigating cases is analogous to
that of over-zealous police officers seizing evidence. As a result of police misconduct in seizing
evidence, the exclusionary rule was developed by the courts to protect the rights secured by the
fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. C. WHITEBREAD & C.
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16-44 (2d ed. 1986). The exclusionary rule arguably de-
ters police misconduct by making illegally seized evidence, and fruits of that evidence, inad-
missible at trial. Id.
A common concern shared by courts in exclusionary rule cases, and equally applicable in
the NME II case, is whether a litigant should receive a windfall merely because the govern-
ment did not follow the "rules." In both situations, when the court imposes a sanction, the
government "loses." While both the exclusionary rule and court sanctions serve to deter mis-
conduct and promote judicial integrity, the courts are very cognizant of the equities of one
person reaping such a reward when the court imposes such a sanction.
255. Alschuler, supra note 245, at 638.
256. Note, Legal Ethics: The Second Circuit Reacts to Prosecutorial Misconduct, 49 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 1245-47 (1983); see also Alschuler, supra note 245, at 668; AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, THE JUDICIAL RE-
SPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT 1.10-1.14 (May 1984) [hereinafter STANDING COMMIT-
TEE]; Cf. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 96 (1975) (rare that
prosecutor was disciplined for gross misconduct short of serious criminal offenses).
257. Note, supra note 256, at 1247. This raises the dilemma whether a convicted defendant
should go free because of the prosecutor's conduct. Conversely, the conviction may be par-
tially due to the prosecutor's misconduct. In NME II, DOJ attorneys' attempts to alter the
fact-finding process so polluted the litigation as to leave the trial court no alterntive but to
dismiss the case because it could not ensure a fair trial to both sides.
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warded for his misconduct.258 In the quest for convictions, a prosecutor
may be willing to engage in misconduct and risk a verbal reprimand since
reversible error is rarely found. 9
Like prosecutors, civil government attorneys also represent the sov-
ereign and have a duty to look beyond the confines of the case at hand to
ensure that justice is done.260 As was seen in NME II, civil government
attorneys will endure minor sanctions for their misconduct, confident
that the court will not impose a harsh sanction against them. Recogniz-
ing the power and influence of the federally employed lawyer, we must
establish guidelines of conduct to deter civil attorneys from engaging in-
misconduct.
C. Mechanisms to Control Government Attorney Conduct
Several possible mechanisms exist to oversee the federally employed
lawyer and to achieve increased accountability including: professional
censure by the bar under the rules of professional conduct; civil actions
brought by members of the public; self-regulation within each govern-
mental agency; congressional enactments; and judicial control.261 The
discussion that follows explores judicial control as the best method to
258. Alschuler, supra note 245, at 647. Alschuler describes the typical sequence at trial as
follows:
When prosecutorial misconduct occurs at trial, the defense attorney has, of course,
only two choices. He may object or he may remain silent. If he objects, he then gives
the trial judge two choices-to overrule the objection or to sustain it. If the trial
judge sustains the objection, the usual remedy will be an instruction to the jury to
disregard the prosecutor's improper comments. As simple and basic as it seems, this
procedure leaves the defense attorney effectively boxed in when it comes to an appeal,
whatever the prosecutor's conduct. The purpose of many rules of appellate practice
is, of course, to confine appellate review to exceptional situations. If the defense
attorney has failed to object, the appellate court will ordinarily conclude that the
error was "waived." If an objection was made but overruled, the misconduct will
rarely be so serious that the appellate court will find more than "harmless error."
Finally, if an objection was made and sustained, the appellate court will ordinarily
conclude that the trial judge's instructions effectively "cured" the error.
Id.
259. See J. LAWLESS, JR., supra note 251, at 8. Many prosecutors engage in misconduct
and feel uninhibited in acting aggressively because of the slight risk the court may impose
sanctions. Id. at 576. The solution to prosecutorial misconduct may be to establish standards
that require a prosecutor to be an impartial officer of the court in addition to an advocate.
Alschuler, supra note 245, at 644. Inherent in the combative nature of the adversary system,
however, is that both sides solely want to win. J. LAWLESS, JR., supra note 251, at 8. Another
possible method to curb zealous prosecutors is to target sanctions at the abusive attorney per-
sonally, not at overturning the conviction. For a discussion of creative sanctions in a civil
context, see infra notes 390-97 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 239.
261. These methods of controlling government attorney conduct are basically the same ones
that serve to regulate private counsel behavior.
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control abusive conduct by government attorneys. 262
1. Control by professional censure
The Code of Professional Responsibility (Code)263 and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)264 set forth the standard of
conduct for all attorneys, whether private or public.265 Federal attorneys
are bound by the version of the Code or Model Rules adopted in the
jurisdiction where they are admitted to practice law.266 While the major-
ity of the ethical rules apply with equal force to private and government
attorneys, commentators have expressed concern that many Code and
Model Rules provisions do not readily apply to government attorneys.
267
a. ethical rules
These ethical rules of conduct emphasize the attorney-client rela-
tionship. Consequently, they are difficult to apply to the conduct of gov-
262. Many states already have statutes providing the supreme court of the state with the
ultimate power to disbar or suspend all attorneys admitted to the state bar. See, e.g., CAL. Bus
& PROF. CODE § 6100 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 771
(Smith-Hurd 1985); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 13
(West 1984); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-48 (1982).
263. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1982).
264. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
265. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1982);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983). Cf. W. DURANT & A. Du-
RANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 37 (1968) ("Morals are the rules by which a society exhorts
... its members and associations to behavior consistent with its order, security, and growth.").
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) was developed by the American
Bar Association (ABA) in 1969 and has been adopted in a majority of the states. Many states,
however, are now considering whether to adopt the entirely restructured set of rules approved
by the ABA in 1983 as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). This Note
will use "ethical rules" and "ethical provisions" to refer to the general rules regulating the
conduct of lawyers.
Commentators have identified several other sources from which an attorney's professional
and ethical conduct may be derived. See, e.g., Hill, Ethics for the Unelected, 68 A.B.A. J. 950
(1982) (attorney's ethical conduct derived from: the law, the code of professional responsibil-
ity, the attorney's peers, and personal conscience); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 22 (1961)
(attorney duties and obligations created by four sources: statutes, common law, Canons of
Ethics and usage, customs, practice of the bar).
266. Lawry I, supra note 178, at 61. Many federal agencies have adopted the Code of
Professional Conduct either by administrative directive or by regulation. Poirier, The Federal
Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A. J. 1541 (1974). A recent proposal to
establish a separate set of admission standards for federal practice has been abandoned.
Moore, Licensing of Attorneys for Federal Practice, LITIGATION NEWS, Winter 1987, at 8.
267. Lawry I, supra note 178, at 61.
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ernment counsel.2 6 8 The identity of "the client" of a government lawyer
is harder to ascertain than for a private attorney and often depends on
the function performed by the federal lawyer.
2 69
The Code stresses the duties required of an attorney toward his or
her client. The Code, however, is silent on the issue of whom the govern-
ment attorney represents270 and commentators have posited a variety of
conflicting views.27 I Under the Code, the government attorney is seen as
representing the agency for whom he or she works.272
The general focus of the Model Rules is broader than that of the
Code and encompasses the attorney's responsibilities to those other than
268. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY canon 4 (1982) (prohibiting
disclosure of client confidences); id. canon 7 (zealously represent client).
269. Lawry II, supra note 225, at 631-32.
270. While no Code provision directly addresses the issue of the government attorney's
client, the discussion of "entity" representation in EC 5-18 is somewhat analogous. That sec-
tion provides:
[a] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance
to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or
other person connected with the entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep
paramount its interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by the
personal desires of any person or organization.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1982); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 comment (1983). Similarly, the government attorney is
protecting the interests of his "client," and not the persons employed by it. EC 5-18 provides
at least a basis to apply the Code to government attorneys.
Some commentators, in fact, suggest that the Code and the Model Rules be rewritten to
specifically cover the conduct of a government attorney. See, e.g., The Committee of the Fed-
eral Courts, An Examination of the Proposed Uniform Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforce-
ment, 32 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 666 (1977) [hereinafter Committee Report].
271. See, e.g., Lawry II, supra note 225, at 632 (identifying four possibilities for the client of
a government lawyer: "(1) society or the public interest; (2) the government itself, viewed as a
self-contained bureaucracy (the 'state' as opposed to 'society'); (3) the agency or department of
the government, considered as a self-contained unit or entity; and (4) one or more officials of
the agency or department, considered in their official capacities"). Lawry points out that the
identity of the client may be deduced from a series of questions such as: who does the attorney
take direction from in matters to be decided by the "client," whose "interests" is the lawyer
trying to foster or protect and whose "confidences" is the lawyer obligated to respect. Id. at
631-32. This "client" analysis, however, must also take into account the duties to be per-
formed. For example, a government attorney representing a person in a disciplinary proceed-
ing obviously has "a client." A more complex analysis involves a federally employed lawyer
who is the member of the legal staff of a government agency.
272. The generally accepted view is that when the Code refers to "client," it refers to the
agency for which the government attorney works. Professional Ethics Committee, Federal Bar
Association, Opinion 73-1, FED. B.J., Fall 1973, at 71 (the "client" of a federal lawyer is the
agency where the lawyer is employed); FEDERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 5-1 ("immediate
professional responsibility of the federal lawyer is to the department or agency in which he is
employed, to be performed in light of the particular public interest function of the department
or agency"); see also Government Lawyer's "Client," 91 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) No. 32, at 4106-07 (Apr. 30, 1986).
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the client."' 3 While the comments to the Model Rules contain a discus-
sion of the government attorney's duty to the agency for which he or she
works,"v4 the Model Rules state that the client of the government attor-
ney "is generally the government as a whole.
' 275
These conclusions as to the government attorney's client fail to com-
port with discussions by various courts that the client of a government
attorney is the public at large.276 Applying the Code and the Model
Rules to federal lawyers has only added to the confusion in this area. As
a result, these ethical rules hardly suffice as a mechanism to control gov-
ernment attorney misconduct.
277
Regardless of the identity of the client, both the Code and the Model
Rules contain ethical provisions that impose special duties exclusively on
public counsel.2 78 For example, a government attorney in a civil action
has a duty to seek justice.179 While neither the Code nor the Model
Rules advocates winning at all costs, the ethical rules themselves recog-
273. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1983).
274. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 comment (1983). The Model
Rules have deleted the specific provisions dealing with government attorneys which were con-
tained in the Code. The situation of government attorneys is adddressed in the comment to
the rule involving representation of organizations. Id.
275. Id. The Model Rules analogize between the role of a lawyer for an entity and a lawyer
for the government, stating that the client of the government attorney is the "government at
large." Id. The Model Rules, however, fail to clarify whether the client is actually the govern-
mental bureaucracy or the people. Id.
276. See, e.g., Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (There is
much to "suggest that government counsel have a higher duty to uphold because their client is
not only the agency they represent but also the public at large"). For a further discussion, see
supra note 214.
277. The application of these ethical rules has yet to be clearly set forth. Interestingly, the
ethical guide of the DOJ itself sheds no light on this topic, but merely contains a compilation
of the various provisions. See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE FEDERAL ATTORNEY (1984)
(this book contains inter alia Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-1965) (Standards of
Ethical Conduct); 5 C.F.R. § 735 (Employee Responsibilities and Conduct); 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-
10 (1982) (Crimes and Criminal Conduct); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1982)).
278. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982) (restraints on pros-
ecutors); id. EC 7-14 (duty of government attorney to fairness); id. EC 9-3 (avoid appearance
of professional impropriety); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (1983)
(limiting successive government and private employment); id. Rule 1.13 comment (maintain.
ing confidences as a government attorney).
279. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1982). In fact, the in-
scription around the rotunda of the Department of Justice reads: "The United States wins its
point whenever Justice is done its citizens in the courts." Frankfurter, supra note 213, at 27;
see also D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, supra note 236, at 38. In contrast, the private attorney
has a duty to zealously represent his client. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 7 (1982); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1983).
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nize that the government attorney is not comparable to his private coun-
terpart and require the government attorney to consider more than
merely the case at hand." °
Recognizing these specific ethical rules limiting a government attor-
ney's conduct, however, is not sufficient."' 1 In fact, in NME II, Judge
Coyle found the DOJ attorneys' conduct was sanctionable. although he
believed the conduct did not violate any professional ethical code. 82 The
DOJ attorneys' behavior in NME II was actually proscribed by several
ethical provisions: attorneys may not disobey a court order;28 3 attorneys
may not interfere with access to witnesses or evidence;2 84 attorneys shall
avoid the appearance of impropriety;285 attorneys may not encourage a
third-party witness to withhold information from the other side;28 6 and
attorneys may not undertake conduct which is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice.2 87 Thus, even courts are confused as to whether con-
duct of government attorneys violates either the Code or the Model
Rules.
280. See supra note 278.
281. The ethical rules themselves have often been viewed as merely a "minimalist code."
Cf. D. Callahan, Minimalist Ethics, in ETHICS IN HARD TIMES (1981) (defining "minimalist
ethics" as that standard of behavior that merely avoids that which is prohibited and does not
strive for any higher moral obligation).
282. May 18, 1984 Order, supra note 27, at 3 n.2. Judge Coyle further characterized the
government's acts as an "approach of one-upsmanship which the Court [found] distasteful and
disfavor[ed]." Id.
283. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(A) (1982) ("A lawyer
shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a
tribunal made in the course of a proceeding .. "); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT 3.4(c) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not: ... knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal . . ").
284. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(A) (1982) ("A lawyer
shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or pro-
duce."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) & (b) (1983) ("A lawyer
shall not: ... unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence.., or counsel or assist a
witness to testify falsely .... ").
285. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (1982) (attorney shall
avoid even appearance of impropriety).
286. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(A) (1982) ("A lawyer
shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or pro-
duce."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4(a) & (f) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not:
... unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence.., or request a person... to refrain
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party. .. ").
287. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1982) ("A lawyer
shall not: ... [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1983) ("It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to: ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."). Im-
proper communications with persons involved in the litigation, such as took place in the NME
1I case, are prohibited under either code. See supra notes 283-85.
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b. enforcement
The method of enforcing the ethical rules of conduct raises addi-
tional problems when these codes are used as the mechanism to prevent
government attorney misconduct. Generally, these ethical rules are en-
forced by the state supreme court through the state bar association.288
The typical chronology of an enforcement proceeding is as follows: A
complaint is filed with the state bar; the complaint is investigated by the
grievance committee; the committee holds a preliminary hearing; formal
charges are filed against the attorney; the bar holds a formal hearing; a
review committee recommends discipline; the state supreme court holds
a hearing, and discipline is enforced. 89
However, enforcing these rules against a federally employed attor-
ney raises federalism issues.290 The state bar association is charged with
disciplining attorneys who are licensed to practice within the state.291 In
many jurisdictions, a federal lawyer must be admitted to practice within
the state before he may practice in the federal courts within the state's
boundaries.292 Consequently, a state often exercises power over federal
officials. While a state cannot outrightly regulate the federal govern-
ment,293 the state can regulate the individual actors of the federal
government.
294
Under the supremacy clause, however, a state may not limit the ex-
ercise of the federal license to practice law. 95 As a result, any state bar
power to discipline federal attorneys is purely illusory. The federal
courts need not recognize the disbarment of one of its members by the
288. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 245, at 670.
289. See H. DRINKER, supra note 265, at 34-35; Alschuler, supra note 245, at 670; see also
Lester v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 547, 551 P.2d 841, 131 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1976).
290. Federalism involves the allocation of powers between the state and federal govern-
ments. This doctrine recognizes the concern of states over undue intrusion by the federal
government. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-1-2-4, 15-19,
§ 3-37, 139-40 (1978); Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977).
291. Generally, the state supreme court has delegated to the state bar disciplinary power
over the attorneys licensed to practice within the state. The ultimate responsibility for attor-
ney conduct, however, remains with the court. See, e.g., In re Ellis, 12 Cal. 3d 442, 525 P.2d
699, 115 Cal. Rptr. 795 (1974).
292. Cf. Simonelli, State Regulation of a Federal License to Practice Law, CASE & COM.,
Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 30, 32.
293. See Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1920).
294. L. TRIBE, supra note 290, § 6-28 at 393.
295. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (federal regulations take precedence over
state law regarding practice of law before Patent office); Ex parte McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293 P.
47 (1930) (beyond jurisdiction of state courts to attempt to regulate practice of attorneys ap-
pearing before federal courts within the state). But see In re Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla.
1953) (rule requiring person who practices law within state to be member of state bar equally
applicable to attorney with only federal tax practice).
GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
state bar.2 96 The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "disbar-
ment by federal courts does not automatically flow from disbarment by
state courts. 2 97 Thus, while a lawyer is often admitted to practice in a
federal court by way of a state court, he is not automatically kept out of
federal court when banished from state court.2 98 Such a policy leads to
the anomalous result that an attorney may be prohibited from practicing
in the state courthouse and yet be allowed to walk across the street and
practice in the federal courthouse.2 99
Ethical rules and state bar associations do not sufficiently control
government attorney conduct. Neither the Code nor the Model Rules
specifically addresses the government attorney's situation. Moreover, be-
cause federal courts need not adopt the disciplinary determinations of the
state bar associations, the ethical provisions that bind the profession do
not prevent government attorney misconduct.3 °
2. Private civil remedies
In addition to the rules of professional conduct, the client's role is
important in controlling the conduct of a private attorney.301 For exam-
ple, the private client determines the objectives of the representation. °2
A client must also be consulted by the attorney regarding any settlement
or plea.303 If the client feels the representation is inadequate, he or she
may fire the attorney and seek other counsel. 3 1 Unfortunately, a gov-
ernment attorney does not have the benefit of a client to guide his or her
behavior. First, the public is likely unaware of the misconduct. Second,
296. Simonelli, supra note 292, at 33.
297. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1956). In Theard, the Court refused to
uphold the automatic acceptance of the state court's disbarment of an attorney. The court
stated that "[w]hile a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a state court, he is not
automatically sent out of the federal court by the same route." Id. at 281.
298. Id. Committee Report, supra note 270, at 666 (citations omitted).
299. Committee Report, supra note 270, at 666 (citations omitted). Recognizing this anom-
aly, many commentators have proposed that a set of federal disciplinary rules be established.
Id. at 673. Recent movements to establish a set of uniform federal rules for disciplining federal
attorneys and a system for licensing those in federal practice have been abandoned. Moore,
supra note 266, at 8.
300. "When dealing with ethical principles... we cannot paint with broad strokes. The
lines are fine and must be so marked. Guide-posts can be established.., and the conclusion in
a particular case can be reached only after painstaking analysis of the facts and precise applica-
tion of precedent." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
301. Lawry II, supra note 225, at 633.
302. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1982); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
303. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1982); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
304. Cf. Lawry II, supra note 225, at 633.
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the public as a whole cannot exert adequate pressure on its public ser-
vants to prevent misconduct.30 5
The major obstacle to a member of the public bringing a civil action
against a federal attorney is lack of standing.30 6 The party seeking to
have his claim adjudicated by a federal court must have a "sufficient
stake" in the controversy so that it may be resolved by the federal
CoUrt.
3 0 7 The Supreme Court has stated that to satisfy the standing re-
quirement, a litigant must demonstrate (1) injury in fact, (2) that the
injury was caused by the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury is
redressable by a favorable decision of the court.30 8 Thus, if a member of
the public were to challenge alleged misconduct by government attor-
neys, he must plead sufficient injury to meet the standing requirement.
Assuming that a member of the public becomes aware of some fed-
eral lawyer misbehavior and is able to bring an action that meets the
standing test, several different types of suits are available for him or her
to bring. For example, a citizen may file a civil suit against an individual
government attorney alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,30 9 established that a person may bring an action
directly against federal officers for a denial of constitutional rights.310
Although a Bivens action is more commonly used against police miscon-
duct, the Court stated that this type of suit should be used where consti-
tutional rights are being deprived. The use of such actions in the
criminal justice system for police officer misconduct, however, has
proven an ineffective remedy to deter misconduct in that arena.
31'
A person may also file a suit against the government as a whole
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).312 The FTCA provides a
cause of action for damage to property due to a negligently caused wrong
committed by a federal employee acting within the scope of his or her
305. See supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
306. See L. TRIBE, supra note 290, §§ 3-17-3-29, at 79-114.
307. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
308. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see also
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
309. 403 U.S. 388 (1971), on remand, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
310. Id.
311. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 254, at 46-47; see also Foote, Tort Reme-
dies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955). See generally .
SILVER, POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 1.04 (1986).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
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employment.313 The inherent problem with this type of suit is that the
person must experience damage to property.314 This is very unlikely
when examining the misconduct of attorneys.
A further civil remedy for government attorney misconduct is an
injuction. This action would be brought against the offending lawyer
based on unconstitutional acts or actions beyond the scope of his or her
duties.3"5 As an action at equity, the citizen would have to show re-
peated, persistent misconduct and no adequate remedy at law.31 6 Thus
far, injunctions have not proven to be a widely utilized method of con-
trolling the behavior of the government.3 17
Another civil remedy that may be brought against a private attorney
and not against the government is a suit for malpractice. Unlike his or
her public counterpart, a private attorney is constantly aware that his or
her client may bring a malpractice action against the attorney. Malprac-
tice suits for negligent representation against private attorneys have be-
come increasingly prevalent.31 8 Conversely, while the potential for
malpractice liability has proven an effective method to control the private
attorney, the same is not true for government attorneys, since a govern-
ment attorney is immune from malpractice suits.
319
While several possible civil remedies can to be brought by a member
of the public, none can effectively control misconduct by government at-
torneys. Relying on actions brought by the public will not adequately
curb federal lawyer abuses.
3. Self-regulation within the agency
Another method to control government attorney misconduct is to
allow the employer-governmental agency 320 to set up procedures to mon-
313. Id. For a discussion of how the FTCA further abrogated sovereign immunity, see
supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
314. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
315. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695, reh'g denied, 338
U.S. 840 (1949).
316. Id.
317. Cf. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 254, at 57.
318. See Gates, Charting the Shoals of Malpractice, A.B.A. J., July 1987, at 62; Gates, Law-
yers' Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem, 37 MERCER L. REv. 559
(1986).
319. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, reh'g denied,
361 U.S. 855 (1959); see also Faure & Strong, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: No
Standard for Malpractice, 47 MONT. L. REv. 363 (1986); Edmondson, Legal Ethics, 37 MER-
CER L. REV. 297 (1985).
320. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the conduct of all federal adminis-
trative agencies. 5 U.S.C. §§ 101-912 (1982). The APA defines "agency" to mean each au-
thority of the government except the courts and the Congress. Id. § 105.
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itor the actions of its lawyers.32' An agency, such as the DOJ,322 is en-
tirely a creature of statute and has only the power given it by Congress
through its enacting legislation. 323 An agency may promulgate both sub-
stantive rules that create new law and interpretative rules that dictate
internal operations. 324 Thus, the DOJ could promulgate and enforce reg-
ulations to prevent misconduct. Similar types of honor systems, how-
ever, have been rejected by commentators in the field of administrative
law as unworkable means to control agency abuses.32 5
Courts and commentators have recognized the amount of power
vested in agencies.326 To allow an agency to exercise control by self-
promulgated rules, bureaucratic tradition or popular opinion has been
considered by some to be overly optimistic. 327 An agency is not allowed
to exercise even its interpretative rulemaking function without proper
checks.3 28 Further, discretionary acts of an agency are subject to judicial
review because of the potential for institutional abuse. 329 The failure of
some agencies to carry out their mandate has created further demands
for methods to ensure that agencies serve the interests they were created
to protect.3 30
Establishing general rules which could be applied consistently
within the agency would eliminate ad hoe decision making.331 To formu-
late such meaningful rules, however, may require that the agency expend
321. Typically, Congress creates an agency by enacting legislation that specifies the
agency's mandate. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 35-36 (2d ed. 1984).
322. The DOJ is specifically listed in the APA as an agency and is treated as any other
agency of the executive branch. 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). All executive departments are agencies
within the meaning of the APA because they are the organizations through which the presi-
dent exercises his executive powers. See I STEIN, MITCHELL & MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 4.02 (1987).
323. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1, 149-53 (2d ed. 1978); see also B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 321, at 10.
324. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 323, § 2.7, at 82-87. See generally J. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RULEMAKING: STRUCTURING, OPPOSING AND DEFENDING FEDERAL AGENCY REGU-
LATIONS (1983).
325. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.3, 163-67 (2d ed. 1978). Adminis-
trative law deals with that body of law which governs administrative agencies. See I K. DA-
VIS, supra note 323, §§ 1.1-1.3, at 1-25 for a discussion of the general parameters of
administrative law.
326. M. DIMOCK, supra note 191, at 12.
327. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1675. In fact, some believe that because of a government
official's intense commitment to his mission, such agency generated directives may be dis-
obeyed. P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 8-9 (1983).
328. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 325, § 8.9, at 196-97.
329. Id.
330. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1682. The attorney in such a situation becomes the servant
of the vested special interests, rather than a servant to society as a whole. Id.
331. Id. at 1698.
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a considerable amount of resources which may be better spent else-
where.3 32 Commentators have conceded that if an agency implemented a
series of self-regulating policies, the problem of abuse within an agency
still would not be controlled.333 Agency zeal simply cannot be expected
to result in curbed agency power.3 34
The role of the courts in monitoring agencies has varied considera-
bly with time.335 The judiciary has recently assumed the primary duty to
scrutinize the actions of agencies. The fear of unbridled discretion has
given rise to a court's right to review virtually any act of an agency.33 6
This problem of controlling agency actions is seen by some commenta-
tors as the most pressing problem facing administrative law.337 The
court's part in reviewing agency actions has been described as "one of
containment," to ensure that the agency has acted within its mandate.
338
Courts, not the agencies themselves, have a vital role in realizing the
public purposes and overseeing agencies.339
The NME II facts dictate against allowing agencies to regulate
themselves. In NME II, the government suggested that instead of dis-
missing the case, Judge Coyle could impose formal guidelines requiring a
senior government attorney to directly supervise each junior attorney.
The district court rejected this proposal in light of the pattern of miscon-
duct by the senior government counsel.3 41 The NME 11 district judge did
not believe that the DOJ was capable of monitoring its own conduct.
While an agency is free to promulgate operating and procedural rules
332. Id. at 1700.
333. Id. at 1702. In an analogous area, police departments have attempted to institute poli-
cies to stop misconduct and abuses by officers. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note
254, at 63. In the abstract, this method would appear to be the most efficient way to regulate
police conduct; supervisors would control the substance and procedure and the officers would
be more likely to accept punishment from an insider. Id. In practice, however, self-regulation
is not effective because departments withhold allegations of misconduct, and procedures are
often ineffective. Id.; see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974).
334. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1698. This is true because often "excessive agency indepen-
dence serves to defeat accountability in government." Meese, Towards Increased Government
Accountability, 32 FED. B. NEWS & J. 406, 407 (1985).
335. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
336. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
337. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
338. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1675. Traditionally, courts ensured that an agency's ac-
tions were not "arbitrary and capricious." Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975).
This served to bridge the gap between separation of powers and the combination of functions
present in an agency. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1676.
339. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 321, at 436-37.
340. Appellees' Rehearing Brief, supra note 95, at 8-9; see supra note 152.
341. Appellees' Rehearing Brief, supra note 95, at 8-9.
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within its legislative mandate, such interpretative rules alone are not suf-
ficient to control the behavior of government attorneys.
4. Control by Congress
An effective regulator of government attorneys, as employees of the
executive branch, is either of the two other branches of the federal gov-
ernment: Congress or the courts.34 2 Congress can control the actions of
government attorneys in numerous ways. Congress could pass new stat-
utes, slash funding, institute investigations, not approve presidential
nominees, supervise through standing committees, require formal con-
gressional clearance of particular administrative decisions or change the
mandate of the agency.343 Most of these methods, however, would re-
quire a number of years to produce results.
As our society has grown increasingly complex, Congress' energies
have been spread thin with the result being much inaction and political
stalemate. 344 However, Congress has begun to take affirmative measures
to hold the government more accountable for its actions by abrogating
sovereign immunity.345 Through the passage of a series of statutes, Con-
gress has attempted to place the government on equal footing with other
litigants.346
Additionally, Congress performs a basic supervisory function over
342. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 323, §§ 2.7-2.8, at 82-91. Inherent in the framework of our
system of government is the idea of checks and balances. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J.
Madison). The founders were worried that one branch of the government would have unlim-
ited power. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). The founders were particularly suspicious
that the executive branch would become too powerful and establish a tyranny. Id. To guard
against one branch of government obtaining too much power, the federal system was designed
with three co-equal branches to monitor the activities of the other branches. THE FEDERALIST
No. 9 (A. Hamilton). The founding fathers believed that the powers of government should be
separate and that each branch should be distinct. Johnson, supra note 201, at 463; see also L.
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 3-19
(1985).
343. L. FISHER, supra note 342, at 119.
344. L. JAFFE, supra note 189, at 45. This is especially true when Congress deals with an
executive agency, like the Department of Justice. L. HUSTON, A.S. MILLER, S. KRISLOW &
R. DIXON, JR., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968). To
remove an employee of the executive branch, Congress could pass a concurrent resolution
expressing the sentiment that the president remove the executive official. L. FISHER, supra
note 342, at 96. Congress could also use its investigative power to precipitate resignation. Id.
Such actions are unlikely when the individual is a lower level federal lawyer in the DOJ, such
as were involved in NME II.
345. K. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 39
(1982); see also S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
POWER 108-09 (1975).
346. See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
the agencies employing government attorneys. When Congress delegates
power to an agency, such as the DOJ, Congress must stand ready to
oversee the functioning of that agency.347 A single plan devised by Con-
gress to monitor government attorney conduct would resolve differences
between the ethical rules of the various state bar associations and estab-
lish a uniform set of standards.348 Congress can also exert control to
ensure that the agency's actions conform to the specific legislative direc-
tives for the agency.349
Congress could also oversee the conduct of government attorneys by
developing precise legislative policies for the agencies to follow. A major
drawback to such a congressional remedy is that it paints with very
broad strokes. If Congress chose to tailor separate remedies for the spe-
cific demands of each type of government attorney, Congress would cre-
ate a patchwork of rules. A statute that encompassed all possible
situations and circumstances would be almost impossible to draft. When
Congress drafts a statute, it cannot be sure of all the specifics to include.
When judgments or predictions are wrong, the statute must be re-writ-
ten.3"' Such an all-encompassing scheme seems inappropriate when jux-
taposed with the recent deregulation statutes enacted by Congress.3"' An
across the board effort to legislate would also decentralize responsibility
and further erode political accountability for decisions. 2
Furthermore, any congressional plan would require a great amount
of time to develop. Such a task would require resources that Congress is
often unable or unwilling to allocate.353 This is due primarily to the lo-
gistics of a democratic system of government. Modifications to the stat-
utes might not meet the contingencies of the situation because of this
time lag. In addition, Congress has also been criticized as weak and un-
able to pass legislation except under threat of calamity or force of over-
whelming public opinion.3 54  Relying on Congress to remedy the
problem of government attorney misconduct seems doomed to failure.
Even if a uniform system were developed to regulate the conduct of
federal attorneys, implementing detailed legislative policies would not be
347. L. JAFFE, supra note 189, at 41; see supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
349. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1673.
350. L. FISHER, supra note 342, at 119.
351. Rabin, supra note 335, at 1317-19.
352. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1695.
353. Id.
354. K. WARREN, supra note 345, at 38-39. Worse still, Congress has been accused of
"political sleight of hand" by ducking hard issues and drafting ambiguous legislation. See
Meese, supra note 334, at 407.
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feasible.355 Congress lacks any real mechanism to enforce a series of stat-
utes and must ultimately rely on the judiciary to see that the provisions
are being carried out.356 While Congress has the potential to play a sig-
nificant role in curbing government attorney misconduct, the major re-
sponsibility to oversee this area should reside with the judicial system.
5. Judicial control
The judiciary boasts the best mechanism to control government at-
torney misconduct. The courts have long been recognized as having the
power and duty to monitor the acts of counsel appearing before it.357
Courts have taken an active role in disciplining attorneys for miscon-
duct.35 ' In addition, the judicial system has the primary responsibility
for enforcing the ethical standards of behavior.359
The founding fathers recognized the need for a strong judiciary to
monitor the exercise of power by the other two branches of govern-
ment.360 The framers of the constitution felt that the survival of the
country depended on maintaining a strong and independent judiciary.361
They believed that the 'courts must have the power to resolve disputes
between individuals and governmental institutions.362 The grant of
power to the judiciary was a mandate for federal courts to check and
restrain any overstepping by the legislative or executive branches on the
rights of the people.363 While the founding fathers also realized that any
exercise of judicial power would create tensions between the federal
courts and the other branches, 36 the judiciary has been viewed as the
branch of government least dangerous to political rights.3 65 The courts
355. Stewart, supra note 164, at 1695.
356. L. TRIBE, supra note 290, §§ 3-1-3-4, at 20-32. Compare R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 84 (1977) (community should be governed by people elected by and re-
sponsible to majority) with C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 330 (1986)
(courts must review actions of political branch in protecting rights).
357. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1036. Appellate courts often admonish trial courts not
to minimize the extent of their responsibilities to correct misconduct. Alschuler, supra note
245, at 654-55.
358. Comment, supra note 4, at 1063.
359. See supra note 262 and accompanying text; see also 11 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) No. 201, at 101-07 (Nov. 14, 1984).
360. Johnson, supra note 201, at 464. Chief Justice Marshall believed that the judges were
separated from the people by tenure of office and by the nature of their duties. Id.
361. Id. The federal courts secured for themselves the power of judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
362. Johnson, supra note 201, at 464.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 465.
365. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
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have the least capacity to annoy or injure these rights because courts
have no influence over "the sword or the purse. ' 366 From early times, a
judge was regarded as guaranteeing the rights of citizens against the as-
saults of the other branches.367 Thus, the actions of the DOJ, as an exec-
utive agency, come under the purview of the courts.
368
Judicial review is often seen as a means to curb unjust agency ac-
tion.369 The courts must see that the interests of the public are promoted
and the interests of the minorities are protected.370  Recently, federal
judges have more actively stepped in to resolve a larger variety of dis-
putes.371 As a result, the courts have helped shape many procedures and
substantive policies.372 This current trend of judicial activism also has
the potential to become a powerful force to protect interests of litigants
from the abuses of government misconduct.373
Controlling the misconduct of government attorneys is something
for which judges are especially well-equipped. 374 A district judge has the
opportunity to observe the misconduct of lawyers firsthand. The NME
/1 case demonstrates that the judiciary is the proper body to protect par-
366. Id.
367. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 201, at 156-57; see also Johnson, supra note 201, at
466; K. WARREN, supra note 345, at 41.
368. K. WARREN, supra note 345, at 41.
369. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 321, at 429; K. WARREN, supra note 345, at 42. Any argu-
ment favoring Congress over the courts as the body to control government attorney miscon-
duct seems unfounded because of the grant of power to the courts. K. WARREN, supra note
345, at 378. In addition, the interests and decisions of the democratic branches may be re-
viewed by the courts. Id. at 331. At least one commentator has posited that the decisions of
the judiciary are superior to actions by the legislature because they are more principled. Id.
Further, this view has been heralded as better protecting the rights of the minority. See C.
WOLFE, supra note 356, at 330-3 1; Stewart, supra note 164, at 1694; see also supra notes 320-40
and accompanying text.
Responsible government must be ready to justify anything it does. R. DWORKIN, supra
note 356, at 191. Government must demonstrate that its acts were calculated to generate more
over-all benefit than harm. Id. The judiciary must then engage in this balancing of interests.
Id. The government lawyer, as an attorney and a bureaucrat, must look to the courts to re-
solve the conflict between what the agency wants him to do and what the courts say he should
do. D. HOROWITZ, supra note 197, at 1.
370. K. WARREN, supra note 345, at 370; C. WOLFE, supra note 356, at 330. The role of
the federal judge has been described as to dispose of cases by trial or settlement with fairness
and an optimum blend of prompt decision and rightness of result. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS 224 (1985).
371. Id. at 367.
372. Id.
373. Stewart, Self-conscious Interest and the Democratic Process: The Case of Citizens Regu-
lating Agencies and Federal Courts, LAW & POL'Y Q., Oct. 1979, at 1, 417.
374. See supra notes 49 & 109.
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ties from the abusive conduct of an executive agency, such as the DOJ.3 75
The federal courts are empowered to promulgate and enforce sanctions
against litigants and their counsel.376 Further, any solution devised by
Congress could be prospective only and would not deal with the miscon-
duct as it occurred. Congress must also rely upon the courts to review
and enforce any laws it passes. Therefore, the courts are best suited to
assume responsibility for control of government attorney conduct.377
D. Guidelines for Imposing Sanctions Against Government Attorneys
Acknowledging that government attorneys should be held to a
higher standard of conduct, and that the judiciary is the most qualified
entity to impose any sanctions for substandard conduct, the question be-
comes: what should be the standard of conduct for government attor-
neys? The standard must be flexible so courts are not reluctant to
enforce it, and broad enough to cover all types of misconduct. The
guidelines for imposing sanctions must also meet the demands of a par-
ticular situation as well as be strict enough to deter future misconduct.
Most importantly, the standards must give the district judge discretion in
assessing the conduct of attorneys occurring within the courtroom. 378
In order to satisfy these various requirements, courts must establish
a standard that accounts for the type of misconduct involved, considers
the need to maintain public faith in the judicial system and then exam-
ines the severity of sanction to impose. Only after weighing these factors
should a court decide whether to impose an effective sanction against a
government attorney.
1. Type of misconduct
a. character of misconduct
When assessing attorney misconduct, a court must consider the
"character" of the conduct.37 9 Thus, a court must look not only at the
375. The courts must clear their calendars of misbehaving lawyers so that innocent parties
may have speedier access to the justice system. M. DIMOCK, supra note 191, at 135.
376. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (providing that Supreme Court may prescribe rules of civil
procedure). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 allows the district courts to make local rules
governing its practice.
377. M. RHEINSTEIN, WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 590 (P. Sayre ed. 1947).
378. Without clear standards that judges are willing to enforce, civil government attorneys,
like prosecutors, will be encouraged to engage in misconduct. See supra notes 258-59 and
accompanying text.
379. A distinction based on the type of misconduct is analogous to a distinction recognized
in the criminal justice system. A prosecutor's misconduct involving threats or improper argu-
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fact that a court order was violated but must also determine exactly what
actions took place. The court's analysis should examine both objective
and non-objective misconduct. The differentiating feature between objec-
tive and non-objective misconduct is the ease with which the court may
identify it. Actions that are easy to detect are objective behavior. Objec-
tive behavior would include failing to answer interrogatories or failing to
meet court-imposed deadlines. On the other hand, non-objective conduct
is more difficult to detect and lies within the discretion of the court. This
type of conduct would include whether the interrogatory answers pro-
vided actually satisify the request.
While the court relies on the parties to bring both types of miscon-
duct to its attention, objective misconduct exists in a binary world. In
examining interrogatories, the court would determine if the questions
have or have not been answered. Whether the answers are acceptable
and in good faith is not always obvious and is more typical of a non-
objective problem. The court must distinguish between these types of
misconduct because non-objective misconduct has far more insidious and
damaging effects.
The NME II case presents an example of the effect of failing to ex-
amine the type of misconduct involved.38° The DOJ had interfered with
National Medical's ability to secure information by attempting to influ-
ence witnesses. 38 1 This type of non-objective misconduct goes to the
heart of the fact-finding process, potentially tainting the entire proceed-
ing.382 When witnesses are involved, this potential damage to the entire
litigation is much greater than a mere inability to obtain information;
rather, trial testimony itself may be influenced.383 The cases cited by the
ment is evaluated differently than conduct involving concealment or destruction of evidence.
J. LAWLESS, JR., supra note 251, at 586-94.
380. United States v. National Medical Enters., 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986).
381. NME II, 792 F.2d at 911-12.
382. J. TANFORD, supra note 113, at 20-21. Tanford stated that if attorneys were prevented
from talking to witnesses, as was the case in NME II, the judicial system could not work. Id.
at 20. He goes on to say that the attorney's right to interview witnesses is so essential that only
the court, in limited circumstances, should be able to restrict that right. Id. at 21.
Psychological studies have shown that interviews and interrogations can have a great im-
pact on people. E. BERGLER & J. MEERLOO, JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE 71-73 (1963) (discuss-
ing psychological impact on witnesses of various types of interviews and interrogations);
Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concerning the Psychology of Memory
and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 547 (1984) (explores various
ways witness testimony may be distorted). For a discussion of instances where attorneys tried
to improperly influence witnesses, see STANDING COMMITrEE, supra note 256, at III.11-
111.12.
383. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983) (recognizing potential for influ-
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Ninth Circuit in NME II exclusively involved objective misconduct.
384
Applying precedent involving objective misconduct to a situation involv-
ing non-objective misconduct is unsound. This is because of the in-
creased difficulty in detecting the non-objective abuses and the
undermining effects of such misconduct.
Again, because of the special weight given by the public to govern-
ment actions, attempts by government counsel to improperly influence
witnesses or engage in any type of non-objective conduct are of great
concern. 385 Consequently, any effort by government counsel to restrict a
potential witness from freely revealing facts and opinions must be subject
to heightened scrutiny.
Related to the ease of detection of misconduct is the severity of the
potential impact. This analysis should center on the damage done in the
case. 38 6 The fine line between developing all the facts and coaching a
witness is a question of good faith.38 7 Attempts to interfere with the fact-
finding process should be afforded different treatment than mere failures
to answer interrogatories. Non-objective misconduct precludes a genuine
trial on the merits because the whole case has been polluted by the inabil-
ity to gather untainted information. By reviewing the non-objective mis-
conduct of government attorneys, a court will be able to isolate and
sanction the most damaging misconduct.
2. Public policy
In addition to categorizing misconduct, the court should consider
the policy reasons behind imposing sanctions. This analysis must be
broader than the public interest test mandated by the Ninth Circuit in
encing trial testimony is inherent in every contact between prospective witness and an
adversary).
384. See supra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
385. International Business Machs. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). In Edelstein,
government counsel ordered two witnesses to cancel their interviews with IBM. The Second
Circuit emphasized the right of an attorney to unhampered access to witnesses as an important
part of his or her trial preparation and stated that the government actions were inappropriate.
Id. at 42-44; see also United States v. Gregory, 369 F.2d 185, 188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969) (In reviewing prosecutor's refusal to allow defense counsel to
interview witnesses without prosecutor present, court made no distinction between suppression
of evidence and suppression of means to obtain evidence); Coppolino v. Helpern, 266 F. Supp.
930, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court described trial as search for truth and stated that constitu-
tional notions of fair play and due process would not allow attorney to obstruct opponent from
interviewing witnesses).
386. This requirement resembles the Ninth Circuit test for prejudicial impact in NME H1.
As already noted, however, the precedent does not require a showing of actual prejudice. See
supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
387. H. DRINKER, supra note 265, at 86.
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NME 11.388 The court should review the deterrent effect of sanctions in
the instant case as well as how sanctions affect public faith in the bar and
further the interests of judicial integrity.
An important consideration in this area, as demonstrated by NME
II, is to discourage the public from refusing the requests of public offi-
cials. The public should not bear the burden of determining whether a
government request is proper or constitutes over-reaching. Thus, the
government must be prohibited from relying on law-abiding citizens to
carry out improper requests. The possible deterrent effect of a sanction
on other federal lawyers is also a proper consideration for the court.
The courts are responsible for maintaining their own integrity. A
court is in the best position to assess the full content of its order and to
determine whether a party has complied with an order.389 Thus, before
imposing a sanction, the court should consider not only the litigants and
attorneys before it, but the entire judicial system.
3. Types of sanctions
The most difficult part of this analysis is selecting a penalty that will
be effective. The solution may be for courts to use more creative ap-
proaches to achieve the desired results. The courts must concern them-
selves with formulating the appropriate decree for a particular
situation.390 The remedy must correct past abuses and prevent future
ones. Depending on the misconduct, the court may want to maintain
ongoing authority over the misbehaving attorneys.391
This may mean imposing a sanction not against the United States,
but rather imposing a monetary sanction personally against the offending
government attorney.3 92 An even more effective sanction for a govern-
ment attorney may be to bar him or her from practicing in federal court
for a period of time. The court could also write a public letter to the
United States Attorney General indicating that some of his attorneys had
failed to follow an order of the court or had otherwise abused the admin-
istration of justice.393 Public pressure on the Attorney General may help
388. See supra note 95.
389. Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 999 (1973).
390. Johnson, supra note 201, at 469.
391. Id. at 470-71. While these proposals focus on creative disciplinary measures, this Note
recognizes that other, more typical, sanctions are still available to the district judge. See, e.g.,
supra note 8.
392. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
393. D. SEGAL, SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRES-
ENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS 62 (1978).
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him to better monitor his subordinates.3 94 Another method used against
the government in other contexts is a structural injunction.39 Using this
method, a federal court would set forth a detailed order attempting to
restructure an entire bureaucratic agency to eliminate the potential for
further abusive practices.3 96
Judges are often reluctant to dismiss a case for attorney misconduct
where the government is involved. As was shown in NME II, where
government misconduct has occurred, the judge must be vigilant to en-
sure that all parties will receive a fair trial. Federal courts must utilize
new and creative sanctions against government attorneys, in addition to
their traditional arsenal, to control the behavior of these federal
lawyers.397
V. CONCLUSION
The proper standards of conduct for civil federal government attor-
neys have not been clearly set forth by either the courts or Congress. In
United States v. National Medical Enterprises,3 98 the court recognized the
unique position of a federally employed attorney. Society has a right,
according to the court, to have its public servants obey the laws they seek
to enforce. However, the court stopped short of creating a separate set of
standards to assess government misconduct.
The power and influence of government attorneys mandate that the
standard used to measure government attorney conduct be higher than
that for their private counterparts.3 99 Moreover, recent statutes enacted
by Congress hold the government more accountable for its acts. This
394. Id. at 63.
395. P. SCHUCK, supra note 327, at 15-16. Schuck also lists less intrusive ways for a court
to control misconduct. Id. A prohibitory injunction identifies certain conduct as wrongful
and forbids the government from from engaging in such conduct. Id. By excluding choices,
the party is free to select others. In contrast, a mandatory injunction requires the government
to take affirmative acts. Id. In this situation, the court displaces the party's judgment and
substitutes its own. Id. Again, the most judicially intrusive measure is the structural injunc-
tion. Id.
396. Id.
397. For a partial list of sanctions available to a district judge, see supra note 8. Part of the
means to effectively sanction, is to make truth our paramount objective of the adversary sys-
tem. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1055
(1975). Such a goal would mean that trial judges could control litigation excesses by direct
intervention and by better training and regulation of counsel. Id. at 1041.
398. 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986).
399. This resulting rule satisfies equal protection requirements, since different standards are
being applied to individuals who are not similarly situated. The equal protection clause appli-
cable to federally employed lawyers is contained in U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a general
discussion of equal protection cases, see L. TRIBE, supra note 290, §§ 16-1-16-57 at 991-1136.
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trend gives rise to a need to more closely scrutinize the actions of feder-
ally employed attorneys.
The conduct of government lawyers cannot effectively be controlled
by professional censure or through civil remedies. The mechanism to
control abusive conduct is through the other two branches of govern-
ment. While Congress can play a significant role in deterring such con-
duct, the primary responsibility for monitoring and enforcing
government attorney conduct lies with the judiciary.
Any guidelines applied by the courts must take into account the
type of misconduct, the ease of detection and the possible damage to the
other party's case.' Before the court can properly weigh the deterrent
value of any possible sanction, the courts should examine any harm done
to the integrity of the judicial system. By using such an analysis, the
level of conduct expected of a civil federal attorney will be more clearly
defined and readily exhibited.
Marian Wolff Easton*
400. Applying this proposed guideline to the NME II case, Judge Coyle would have been
justified in his concern over the DOJ attorneys' attempts to influence witnesses and interfere
with the fact-finding process. Further, Judge Coyle recognized that for every instance of mis-
conduct brought to his attention, there were likely other instances of misconduct of which he
was not aware. Even under these proposed guidelines, the pervasive nature of the misconduct
involved in NME 11 may have left Judge Coyle no alternative but to dismiss the suit. How-
ever, if he were convinced that National Medical could receive a fair trial, he may have sanc-
tioned government counsel by barring the offending attorney from practicing in federal court
for a period of time. Judge Coyle may also have enjoined the DOJ and required a restructur-
ing of the department to ensure that the agency was adequately monitoring its attorneys.
* Special thanks are due Barry S. Landsberg, Esq. for supplying relevant documents and
generously furnishing insights into the problems of litigating against the government.
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